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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j), 78-2a-
2(3), because this is an appeal from a judgment of a court of record over which the 
Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that the payments by Southern American 
Insurance Company ("SAIC") to CSX Corporation ("CSX") in exchange for a 
release of CSX's current and future claims were for new and contemporaneous 
consideration and therefore not voidable preferences under Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-27-321? 
2. Should the trial court's grant of summary judgment for CSX be affirmed because 
the payments are not voidable preferences under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 
because they (a) were made in the ordinary course of SAIC's business within 45 
days of incurring the debts and according to normal business terms; and (b) 
were not for an antecedent debt. 
Both issues were raised before the trial court through cross-motions for summary 
judgment. (R. 615-28.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); see Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, j[6, 983 P.2d 575. This 
Court reviews for correctness whether the trial court properly entered summary 
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judgment for CSX. See Nova Cas. Co., 1999 UT 69, at 1J6, 983 P.2d 575. Further, 
(
"[i]n matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's 
ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions.'" Valley Colour, 
Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-102 (Supp. 2001). Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(h) "Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation: 
(i) when in exchange for the property or an obligation, as a fair equivalent 
for it, and in good faith: 
(A) property is conveyed; 
(B) services are rendered; 
(C) an obligation is incurred; or 
(D) an antecedent debt is satisfied; 
(ii) when the property or obligation is received in good faith to secure a 
present advance or an antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately 
small compared to the value of the property or obligation obtained. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 (1999). Voidable preferences and liens. 
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any of the property of 
an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of an antecedent 
debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one year before the filing of a 
successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation under this chapter, the effect of 
which transfer may enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt 
than another creditor of the same class would receive. If a liquidation order is 
entered while the insurer is already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers 
otherwise qualifying are considered to be preferences if they are made or 
allowed within one year before the filing of the successful petition for 
rehabilitation or within two years before the filing of the successful petition for 
liquidation, whichever time is shorter, 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, if: 
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer; 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing of the petition; 
(iii) the creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it or his agent acting with 
reference to the transfer had, at the time when the transfer was made, 
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reasonable cause to believe that the insurer was or was about to become 
insolvent; or 
(iv) the creditor receiving it was an officer, an employee, an attorney, or other 
person who was in fact in a position of comparable influence in the insurer 
to an officer, or any shareholder holding directly or indirectly more than 
5% of any class of equity security issued by the insurer, or any other 
person with whom the insurer did not deal at arm's length. 
(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for or because 
of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a debt incurred in the 
ordinary course of the business of the insurer and according to normal business 
terms; 
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable the insurer to acquire the 
property and which is perfected within ten days after the security interest 
attaches; 
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent that after the transfer, 
the creditor gave new value not secured by an unavoidable security interest and 
on account of which the insurer did not make an unavoidable transfer to or for 
the benefit of the creditor; or 
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the 
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all of those types of 
transfers to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount by which the debt 
secured by the security interest exceeded the value of the security interest four 
months prior to the date of liquidation or any time subsequent to the liquidation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case arises from the liquidation of Southern American Insurance Company 
("SAIC"). The liquidator of SAIC ("Liquidator") brought this action in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, seeking to avoid and recover payments that CSX 
received from SAIC pursuant to a lawful settlement of claims relating to asbestos 
insurance coverage with SAIC. The Liquidator claimed that the settlement payments 
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constituted preferential transfers under Utah law and were subject to avoidance and 
recovery. 
CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the payments were 
not avoidable preferences as a matter of law because they were made in exchange for 
new and contemporaneous consideration. The Liquidator opposed CSX's motion and 
submitted his own motion for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the 
trial court ruled that the payments were not voidable preferences because they were for 
new and contemporaneous consideration as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of CSX and denied the Liquidator's motion. The 
Liquidator appeals from the final judgment entered by the trial court. 
Statement of Facts 
SAIC is a Utah company in the business of providing insurance coverage and 
paying benefits to cover claims of policy holders. (R. 2, 38, 311.) SAIC was originally 
incorporated and began providing insurance coverage in 1934 in Tennessee. (R. 210.) 
In 1988, SAIC became domiciled in Utah. (R. 210.) 
As part of its insurance business, SAIC sold third-party liability insurance policies 
to certain railroads that were predecessors of CSX.1 (R. 237-38, 264-65.) These 
policies covered part of CSX's liability for asbestos exposure, including expenses 
incurred defending claims. (R. 251-52.) Under these policies, SAIC was obligated to 
indemnify CSX for "SUMS WHICH [CSX] SHALL BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO 
1The railroads actually were predecessors of, and SAIC actually made the 
payments at issue to, CSX Transportation, Inc., a subsidiary of CSX. (R. 234, 264.) 
However, for convenience in this brief, "CSX" refers to both defendant CSX Corporation 
and CSX Transportation, Inc., except as indicated. 
4 
PAY AS DAMAGES" (R. 333) and for "EXPENSES PAID OR INCURRED." (R. 334.) 
The policies provided that SAIC had no liability for payment to CSX until CSX had 
actually made its own payments on covered liabilities or expenses2 and declared CSX 
would have no cause of action for indemnity until its liability was "FINALLY 
DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL 
TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF [CSX], THE CLAIMANT AND [SAIC]." (R. 
339.) In 1985 the predecessor railroads, and in 1990 CSX, filed three separate lawsuits 
2One insurance policy provided: 
6.6 THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY UNDER THIS POLICY WITH 
RESPECT TO ANY OCCURRENCE SHALL NOT ATTACH UNTIL 
THE AMOUNT OF THE APPLICABLE RETAINED OR OTHER 
INSURANCE LIMIT HAS BEEN PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF 
THE INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH OCCURRENCE. THE 
INSURED SHALL MAKE CLAIM FOR ANY LOSS UNDER THIS 
POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AFTER: 
(A) THE INSURED SHALL HAVE PAID ULTIMATE NET LOSS 
IN EXCESS OF THE RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE 
LIMIT WITH RESPECT TO ANY OCCURRENCE, OR 
(B) THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO PAY SUCH AMOUNTS 
SHALL HAVE BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL 
TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THE INSURED, 
THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY. 
CLAIM FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE 
INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAME OCCURRENCE SHALL 
BE SIMILARLY MADE. ALL LOSSES COVERED BY THIS 
POLICY SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE BY THE COMPANY 
WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY CLAIMED 
AND PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS 
POLICY. 
(R. 338-39.) A copy of this policy is contained in the Addendum as Exhibit 13. 
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(the "coverage suits") to collect coverage benefits relating to asbestos exposure under 
their SAIC policies.3 (R. 264-65.) 
Beginning at least as early as March 1991, CSX and SAIC entered into 
negotiations to settle the coverage suits.4 (R. 251-66.) These negotiations were 
conducted at arms' length between counsel for CSX and SAIC. (R. 251-66.) From 
March 1991 until November 1991, the parties negotiated in good faith and exchanged 
approximately seven settlement offers and counteroffers. (R. 251-66.) During the 
negotiations, it was acknowledged by CSX and SAIC that future asbestos exposure 
claims could be raised by which CSX would suffer losses that were covered by the 
policies with SAIC. (R. 258-60.) At the time of the negotiations, SAIC estimated that 
covered losses to date approximated $109,000, (R. 258) and, although neither CSX nor 
SAIC could then ascertain what CSX's liability for future exposure claims would be,5 
3Those lawsuits were: The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, et al. v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and London Market Insurance Companies, et 
a l , Civil No. 85-3162 (D.D.C), (filed Oct. 3, 1985); Western Maryland Railway 
Company v. Harbor Insurance Company, et al.. Civil No. 85-3163 (D.D.C.) (filed Oct. 3, 
1985); and CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., Civil No. 90-
00015R (E.D. Va.) (filed Jan. 11, 1990). 
4Copies of the correspondence demonstrating these negotiations are included in 
the Addendum as Exhibits 5 through 12. 
5As acknowledged by the Liquidator's counsel during argument before the trial 
court, this uncertainty existed because there could have been asbestos exposure 
during the coverage period that would not give rise to asbestosis and claims against 
CSX until many years later. As counsel stated, 
[Sjome of the occurrences may have been such that we 
wouldn't have known, clear back in 1980, just how much 
money Southern American would owe. For example, if there 
had been a discharge of toxic chemicals, it might not yet be 
known what the cleanup costs would be. If there was 
exposure to asbestos, the asbestosis may not have yet fully 
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CSX estimated the amount of future losses covered by the SAIC policies would total 
$278,700. (R. 259.) 
On October 14, 1991, CSX and SAIC reached a coverage settlement agreement 
("Agreement") in which CSX released SAIC from all past, present, and future6 claims 
that might arise from asbestos litigation. In return, SAIC agreed to pay CSX 
$308,000.00 in three installments. The Agreement provided in relevant part: 
In settlement of the coverage suits, the parties agree to the 
following payment provisions: 
1. Southern will pay CSX the sum of $308,000.00 as follows: 
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991 
$102,667.00 on November 30, 1991 
$102,666.00 on December 31, 1991 
This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any claim by CSX 
against the policies issued by Southern for any losses due to 
Asbestos-Related Claims past, present, or future, whether or 
not asserted in the coverage suits. 
2. Southern shall not be liable to pay CSX for losses due 
to Asbestos-Related Claims other than as set forth in this 
Agreement. 
developed. But the occurrence itself would-the occurrence 
would've had to have happened in these years. 
(R. 642 at 5.) 
6Through the Agreement, SAIC joined the terms of CSX's September 19, 1988 
settlement agreement with other insurers. (R. 470-511.) In distinction from SAIC's 
Agreement, CSX's settlement with the other insurers did not release CSX's rights to 
seek compensation for future losses due to future asbestos exposure claims. (R. 470, 
474, 476-483.) 
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(R. 263-66, 470-72 (emphasis added).)7 As agreed, SAIC issued checks to pay CSX in 
exchange for the release. In accordance with the settlement, SAIC issued a check for 
$102,667.00 on October 28, 1991, a second check for $102,667.00 on November 26, 
1991, and a final check for $102,666.00 on January 2, 1992. (R. 267-82.) Likewise, as 
agreed, after these payments were made, CSX's claims against SAIC for losses 
already incurred related to asbestos exposure were dismissed. (R. 318, 515.) There is 
no claim or contention that the settlement payments were made for any reason other 
than as part of a fair, equitable settlement. CSX denies that SAIC was insolvent or that 
it had any knowledge or belief that SAIC was about to become insolvent. (R. 244.) 
SAIC is currently in liquidation pursuant to a Liquidation Order entered on March 
26, 1992. (R. 2.) On March 25, 1994, the Liquidator filed the present action against 
CSX Corporation, the parent company of CSX Transportation, claiming that the 
payments made by SAIC to CSX pursuant to the Agreement were avoidable 
preferences and were recoverable from CSX under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(1)(b) 
and (c). (R. 4-5.) On February 2, 2000, CSX moved for summary judgment, arguing the 
payments were not avoidable preferences as a matter of law upon the following 
grounds: (1) the payments were for new and contemporaneous consideration; (2) the 
payments were made in the ordinary course of SAIC's business according to usual 
business terms and within 45 days of the date they were legally obligated to be paid; 
and (3) the payments were not preferences because they were made in exchange for 
settlement of claims, including future claims that had not yet accrued, and were not 
made on account of any antecedent debt. (R. 188-272.) On March 30, 2000, the 
7
 A copy of the Agreement is found within Exhibit 12 of the Addendum. 
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Liquidator filed an opposition to CSX's motion and submitted his own motion for 
summary judgment, arguing the elements of a preferential transfer under section 31A-
27-321 existed as a matter of law and addressing the grounds raised in CSX's motion. 
(R. 273-309.) 
On March 5, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on the cross motions for 
summary judgment. (R. 614.) On March 12, 2001, the court issued its memorandum 
decision wherein it ruled that the payments to SAIC were not voidable preferences 
because they were for new and contemporaneous consideration as a matter of law, (R. 
615-628) and, on April 3, 2001, entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
CSX and denying the Liquidator's motion.8 (R. 615-628.) Because the trial court's 
ruling resolved the case in its entirety, the court did not reach the additional issues 
before it. (R. 623.) The Liquidator timely appealed from the grant of summary 
judgment. (R. 631-32.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly determined that the payments by SAIC were for 
new and contemporaneous consideration and not avoidable under the Utah Insurance 
Code. 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4) provides that transfers 
may not be avoided if made for new and contemporaneous consideration. Under well 
settled Utah law, there is consideration when a promisee receives any benefit or a 
promisor suffers any detriment. Here CSX gave up its right to prosecute and receive 
8The memorandum decision and order are found in the Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief as Exhibit C. 
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full payment on its existing claims and to be compensated for expenses and liability 
arising in the future. Consequently, the payments were for new and contemporaneous 
consideration. 
This Court should reject the Liquidator's arguments that read the "new value" 
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code into the Utah Insurance Code. Because the 
Legislature chose to use the term "consideration" and rejected the concept of "new 
value," the statute requires only consideration as defined by Utah law. Nonetheless, 
the Liquidator's arguments, if accepted, are unavailing because CSX gave new value in 
exchange for the payments, including allowing SAIC to escape liability and litigation 
risks and expenses for claims that could have been asserted against CSX in the future, 
which enhanced SAIC's net worth possibly in excess of the amount paid to CSX. 
This Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that the consideration was not 
new. The benefits SAIC received through the Agreement, including a reduced payoff 
on existing claims, saving the expenses and removing the risks of litigation, and 
insulating itself from liability for future claims, were only obtained through the 
agreement, not before. "New" is tied to consideration such that if there is consideration, 
it is by definition new. Further, there is no statutory requirement that consideration be in 
the form of goods, services, or money, or that the creditor prove the dollar value of the 
benefit conferred upon the insurer by such consideration. Rather, whether the 
consideration is sufficient is determined by the insurer's business judgment. Finally, 
CSX's future claims are not actually past claims by virtue of the coverage period ending 
before the Agreement because CSX and SAIC recognized that exposure to asbestos 
10 
within the coverage period could lead to asbestosis in the future and CSX had no right 
to indemnity under the policies until it actually incurred liabilities and expenses. 
Likewise, the Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that the consideration 
was not contemporaneous. The payments were required through the same document 
that secured the benefits to SAIC, and were made as each corresponding debt was 
incurred and as SAIC received the benefits of the Agreement. The Liquidator is 
incorrect that a lack of contemporaneity necessarily follows from there having been an 
antecedent debt because such interpretation would render section 37A-27-321(4)(a) 
meaningless. Further, the debts here were incurred as they were paid and thus were 
not antecedent debts and the authority relied upon by the Liquidator is otherwise 
inapposite. 
Finally, the trial court correctly ruled the payments were not avoidable 
notwithstanding the absence of an appraisal affixing the value of the consideration 
given by CSX. The Utah Insurance Code requires only that there be consideration, not 
a particular amount, and does not provide that a transfer is protected from avoidance 
only "to the extent" of the appraised value of the consideration. 
II. Irrespective of whether the payments were for new and contemporaneous 
consideration, this Court should affirm summary judgment for CSX on the alternative 
grounds raised below because (a) the payments were made in the ordinary course of 
SAIC's business, within forty-five days of the debts being incurred, and for debts 
incurred according to normal business terms; and (b) the payments were not for 
antecedent debts. 
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First, the payments may not be avoided pursuant to the ordinary course of 
business exception in Utah Code Ann. § 37A-27-321(4)(b). A debt is not incurred until 
the debtor is obligated to make payment. Hence, these debts were incurred as each 
payment came due under the Agreement and each payment was made within forty-five 
days of coming due. Indeed, the first two payments were made within forty-five days of 
the Agreement itself and, because SAIC could not have been obligated to pay CSX's 
future claims until CSX's liability and losses were actually incurred, the debts could not 
have been incurred prior to execution of the Agreement. Further, because SAIC is an 
insurer, the debts were incurred in the ordinary course of SAIC's business of evaluating 
insureds' claims, settling those claims, and making payments according to those 
settlements. Finally, the debts were incurred and payments made according to normal 
business terms because the Agreement was a run-of-the-mill transaction for an insurer 
and the payments were made according to the terms of the Agreement. Consequently, 
the payments are within the ordinary course of business exception of section 37A-27-
321(4)(b) and may not be avoided. 
Second, the payments are not preferences because they were not for an 
antecedent debt. The Agreement insulated SAIC from all liability for CSX's future 
losses that had not and could not yet be asserted. These uncertain and unliquidated 
claims cannot constitute antecedent debt. Rather, because debts are not incurred until 
the debtor is obligated to pay and these payments were made as obligated, the debts 
were not antecedent and the payments, therefore, are not preferences. 
III. The proper disposition is to affirm the grant of summary judgment for 
CSX. If, however, the Court determines the trial court erred and rejects CSX's alternate 
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grounds raised below, the proper disposition is to remand the case without direction so 
that the trial court may consider the issues raised but not reached. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE LIQUIDATOR 
MAY NOT AVOID SAIC'S PAYMENTS TO CSX BECAUSE SAIC MADE THE 
PAYMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS 
CONSIDERATION. 
A. Under the Plain Language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, SAIC's 
Payments to CSX Constitute New and Contemporaneous 
Consideration and May Not Be Avoided. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment because it 
correctly determined that the payments to CSX were for new and contemporaneous 
consideration. Section 31A-27-321(4)'s plain language provides that SAIC's payments 
are not avoidable preferences because they were made in exchange for new and 
contemporaneous consideration.9 "This court looks first to the plain language of a 
statute when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and assumes that each term 
was used advisedly by the Legislature." Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 
110, U14, 993 P.2d 875. "Only if we find some ambiguity1101 need we look further." 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). This Court gives 
effect to each term used by the Legislature "according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Utah State Bar v. Summerhaves & Havden, Pub. Adjusters. 905 P.2d 867, 
871 (Utah 1995). 
9As discussed below, the Liquidator ignores the plain language of the statute, 
arguing instead that this Court should construe the statute to effect the purposes of the 
federal Bankruptcy Code, which uses different language. 
10The Liquidator has pointed to no ambiguity in the statute's use of "a new and 
contemporaneous consideration." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(a). 
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"Consideration" is: "The cause, motive, price or impelling influence which 
induces a contracting party to enter into a contract. The reason or material cause of a 
contract. Some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some 
forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the 
other." Blacks Law Dictionary 306 (6th Ed. 1990); see also Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 859 (Utah 1998) ("'Consideration is "an act or promise, 
bargained for and given in exchange for a promise."'") (citation omitted). This Court has 
expressly stated that "consideration may be found 'whenever a promisor receives a 
benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however slight,'" In re Estate of 
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted) (alteration in original), and 
has long held that a release or settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim provides 
sufficient consideration for a binding agreement. See Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc, 72 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1937); see also Wood Realty Trust v. N. Storonslee 
Cooperage Co., 646 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("Discontinuance of a 
pending action, release or promise to forego future litigation can constitute valid 
consideration."). 
CSX gave valuable new consideration in exchange for the payments. Such 
consideration included accepting payment in an amount lower than that to which CSX 
was initially entitled, losing its right to obtain enforceable judgments, appeal any errors 
occurring at trial, and to obtain writs of execution on those judgments. In so doing, CSX 
gave SAIC the significant benefit of resolving the claims, avoiding judgments being 
entered against it, and saving the expense of litigation. Moreover, SAIC removed its 
liability for all claims encompassed within the coverage period that could have been 
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brought in the future. Under Utah law, this constitutes new and contemporaneous 
consideration precluding the Liquidator from avoiding the payments.11 
Indeed, CSX's agreement with SAIC satisfies the definition of "consideration" 
provided by the Utah Insurance Code through its definition of "fair consideration": 
"Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation: 
(i) when in exchange for the property or an obligation, as 
a fair equivalent for it, and in good faith: 
(A) property is conveyed; 
(B) services are rendered; 
(C) an obligation is incurred; or 
(D) an antecedent debt is satisfied; 
(ii) when the property or obligation is received in good 
faith to secure a present advance or an antecedent debt in 
amount not disproportionately small compared to the value 
of the property or obligation obtained. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-102(1)(h) (Supp. 1999). By parsing out the language 
defining "fair," this subsection shows a definition of "consideration" that encompasses 
the instant facts because CSX incurred an obligation—e.g., CSX must release current 
and future claims and accept reduced payment— and satisfied an antecedent 
debt—e.g., canceling the original debt owed for claims under the policies. See Utah 
State Bar, 905 P.2d at 871 ("[W]ords and phrases used in a statute, if also defined by 
11Even under the narrower language used by the Bankruptcy Code, it has been 
held that a release of claims and termination of a lawsuit through a settlement 
agreement may be "new value" precluding the payment in a contemporaneous 
exchange from being avoided. See Lewis v. Diethorn. 893 F.2d 648, 650 (3rd Cir. 
1990); Nelson Co. v. Amquip Corp.. 128 B.R. 930, 935 n.13 (E.D. Pa 1991) (stating 
transfer was contemporaneous exchange for new value and explaining "[defendant] 
exchanged $349,734.32 in principal for $291,712.46 in principal, plus the bonus of a 
litigation free environment (or so it thought, until [debtor] sought to avoid the transfer)"); 
cf. In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co.. 911 F.2d 1223, 1238 n.6 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing 
that "equivalent value" demonstrating transfer was not fraudulent under Bankruptcy 
Code § 548 "could be the release of a just claim against the corporation"). As the Lewis 
court explained, what the party received "was not the freedom from liability on an 
antecedent debt, but the freedom from the risk of litigation." Lewis, 893 F.2d at 650. 
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statute, must be construed according to that definition.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
11 (1993)). Such definition is in accordance with settled Utah case law defining 
consideration. 
Accordingly, it is clear that the trial court correctly determined that the payments 
to CSX were for new and contemporaneous consideration and this Court should affirm 
the grant of summary judgment for CSX. 
B. This Court Must Reject the Liquidator's Flawed Analysis That Defeats 
the Statute's Plain Language by Writing in New Requirements from 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 
The Liquidator ignores the statute's language and instead relies erroneously on 
bankruptcy cases interpreting the different language of the Bankruptcy Code to argue 
there was no new and contemporaneous consideration exchanged for the payments. 
The Utah Code, however, provides that payments may not be avoided if they were for 
"new and contemporaneous consideration," Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(a) (1999) 
(emphasis added), whereas the Bankruptcy Code describes the limit on avoidance as 
"a contemporaneous exchange for new value." 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1) (West 1993) 
(emphasis added). This Court must respect the Legislature's decision to use the word 
"consideration" and may not accept the Liquidator's invitation to rewrite the statute 
according to the language used in the Bankruptcy Code.12 
12CSX agrees with the Liquidator that the preference statute serves the general 
purpose of ensuring that one creditor does not receive a share of the liquidation estate 
disproportionate to that received by similarly situated creditors. Nonetheless, the 
Legislature has balanced the competing interests and implemented the best 
mechanism in its judgment to achieve such purpose. The Legislature determined that a 
creditor does not receive a disproportionate share if it provides consideration for the 
transfer. Hence, the Legislature determined that the liquidation estate is not diminished 
to the detriment of other creditors because the estate receives the new consideration 
and entrusted the decision of whether the consideration is sufficient to warrant the deal 
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Section 31A-27-321 is analogous to the Bankruptcy Code.13 However, the 
Legislature chose to describe the preference avoidance exception of section 31A-27-
321(4)(a) as requiring "consideration," a term of art, rather than "value" as used in the 
Bankruptcy Code.14 Such usage clearly demonstrates an intent to reject the Bankruptcy 
Code's "value" requirements and instead require only "consideration" with its 
concomitant meaning. As this Court stated, "statutory construction presumes that the 
expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another." Biddje, 
1999 UT 110, at IT 14; see also Westside Community Sch. v. Merqens. 496 U.S. 226, 
242 (1990) ("Congress was presumably aware that [this language], as used by the 
Court, is a term of art, and had it intended to import that concept into the act, one would 
suppose that it would have done so explicitly. Indeed, Congress' deliberate choice to 
use a different term . . . can only mean that it intended to establish a [different] 
standard . . . .") (citation omitted). The Legislature's intent is underscored by the fact 
that in section 321, a mere three subparts following the language at issue, the 
to the sound business judgment of the insurer. 
13The Utah Insurance Code expressly recognizes the Bankruptcy Code. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-411 (1999) (providing for severability when statute is 
superseded by the federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). 
14The Bankruptcy Code describes the avoidance exception as follows: 
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer -
(1) to the extent that such transfer was -
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit 
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new 
value given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange . . . . 
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West 1993). A copy of section 547 is included in the Addendum 
as Exhibit 4. 
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Legislature described another limit on avoiding preferences using the term "value" 
instead of "consideration," demonstrating that "consideration" in Utah's statute is distinct 
from "value" in the Bankruptcy Code and that the Legislature is competent to choose 
statutory language advisedly. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(d). 
As recognized by one of the authorities on which the Liquidator relies, In Re 
Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), the language "value" in 
section 547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, is narrowly defined and "demands a more 
exacting or rigid measure of benefit conferred on the debtor." Jd. at 138 (recognizing 
that "value" for purposes of § 547(c)(1) is manifestly narrower than the definition for 
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 548, which concerns fraudulent conveyances). This rigor does 
not apply to the meaning of "consideration" used in the statute at issue here. 
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code expressly defines the requisite new value to 
exclude an obligation substituted for an existing obligation, i.e., a settlement agreement. 
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(2) (West 1993) (providing that "new value . . . does not 
include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation"); In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 
55 B.R. 371, 376-77 (N.D. III. 1985) (stating that this definition excluded a stipulation to 
refrain temporarily from pursuing a lawsuit). Utah's Insurance Code contains no such 
limitation. 
Finally, the Agreement would even satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's requirement of 
new value. Prior to the Agreement, CSX had claims approximating $109,000. With 
respect to those claims, through the Agreement, SAIC saved the costs of litigation and 
benefited, inter alia, from removal of the risk that a judgment would be entered against 
it. In addition, at the time of the agreement, both SAIC and CSX knew there would 
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likely be future claims asserted against CSX that would be covered by the SAIC 
policies. CSX estimated SAIC could be liable for $278,700, and the actual amount 
could have been higher. In exchange for SAIC's payments, under the Agreement, 
SAIC escaped this liability as well as any costs it would have incurred in a subsequent 
action brought by CSX. Irrespective of the benefit SAIC received with respect to past 
and present claims, such liability and costs regarding future claims alone could have 
surpassed the $308,000 paid to CSX, and the Agreement thus correspondingly 
enhanced SAIC's liquidation estate. Hence, even under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
payments were for "new value" and are not avoidable preferences. 
In sum, under the plain language used by the Legislature, the payments may not 
be avoided by the Liquidator because they were exchanged for new and 
contemporaneous consideration. As used by the Utah Insurance Code, only 
consideration—not the Bankruptcy Code's concept of new value—is required and the 
settlement agreement here constituted such new and contemporaneous consideration. 
Nonetheless, even under the Bankruptcy Code, the payments were for new value and 
are not avoidable preferences. Consequently, as a matter of law, the payments may 
not be avoided and this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX. 
C. The Consideration Exchanged by CSX for the Payments Was "New" 
and "Contemporaneous," 
This Court should reject the Liquidator's strained argument by which he asserts 
that the consideration given by CSX in exchange for the payments was neither new nor 
contemporaneous. 
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1. The Consideration Given by CSX Was "New." 
The Liquidator argues that although the Agreement was supported by 
consideration, SAIC received nothing "new." This argument is a complete red herring. 
Before the Agreement, CSX had the right to prosecute its existing claims against SAIC, 
obtain a judgment, and execute on that judgment. CSX further had a right to seek 
compensation from SAIC for liability and expenses on all new asbestos exposure 
claims as they were incurred. After the Agreement, CSX had no such rights, SAIC 
escaped the costs of defending the previously pending actions, and SAIC removed all 
of its responsibility for CSX's future liability and expenses. Because SAIC received 
these significant benefits only through the Agreement in exchange for the payments, 
the consideration was new. 
Indeed, by admitting that there was consideration, the Liquidator necessarily 
admits it was new because there simply is no consideration without it being new. 
"Events which occur prior to the making of the promise and not with the purpose of 
inducing the promise in exchange are viewed as 'past consideration' and are the legal 
equivalent of 'no consideration.'" Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 633 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 210 (1963)); accord 
Jensen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366, 368 (1970) ("The doctrine that 
past consideration is no consideration represents the overwhelming weight of authority 
and is almost universally followed. This has been the law since early times.'") (citation 
omitted). Hence, "new" is inexorably intertwined with whether consideration itself exists. 
If there was nothing "new" obtained by SAIC through the Agreement, there was by 
definition no consideration and, conversely, if there was consideration, it was by 
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definition "new." Consequently, because, as described above, CSX provided 
consideration for the Agreement in exchange for the payments, by definition the 
consideration was new. 
The Liquidator's argument that the consideration provided by CSX must 
measurably enhance SAIC's net worth in terms of goods, services, or money is without 
support. There is no such requirement in the statute. First, unlike the Bankruptcy 
Code,15 the Utah statute does not require "new and contemporaneous goods, services, 
or money." Second, the statute requires only that there be consideration, not 
"sufficient" consideration to enhance the estate in the eyes of the liquidation court. 
Indeed, such a requirement would be antithetical to Utah law under which courts will not 
pass on the sufficiency of consideration provided consideration exists. See In re Estate 
of Beeslev. 883 P.2d at 1351 ("[Consideration may be found 'whenever a promisor 
receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however slight/") (citation 
omitted) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added); Dementas. 764 P.2d at 632 
(u'[A]s a general rule it is settled that any detriment no matter how economically 
inadequate will support a promise.'") (citation omitted). Ensuring it would not have to 
compensate CSX in the future for claims not yet asserted but arising during the 
15The Bankruptcy Code defines "new value" as 
money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or 
release by a transferee of property previously transferred to 
such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor 
voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable 
law, including proceeds of such property, but does not 
include an obligation substituted for an existing 
obligation . . . . 
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(a)(2) (West 1993) (emphasis added). 
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coverage period was a benefit to SAIC.16 The record shows that CSX estimated its 
future covered losses could exceed $278,000. Whether the benefit to CSX justified 
making the payments in a business sense was SAIC's decision and should not be 
second-guessed by the courts. See, e.g., Dementas, 764 P.2d at 632 ("If Tallas 
thought it was worth 50,000 bucks to get one ride to Bingham, that's Tallas' 
decision . . . . The only thing you can't do is take it with you.'"). 
The Liquidator states that no future claims could have arisen after the 
Agreement because the coverage period ended in 1982. This is simply not true. The 
Agreement was not a mere payment plan for CSX's past claims. As the Liquidator's 
counsel recognized during oral argument before the trial court, at the time of the 
Agreement, a person could have been exposed to asbestos within the coverage period 
yet not develop asbestosis for many years. If that person brought an action against 
CSX after execution of the Agreement, because of the Agreement SAIC would not have 
to reimburse CSX for the liability and costs incurred through that action, despite that the 
liability and costs would be covered by the policies. Further, just as the asbestos-
exposed potential plaintiff could not bring an action against CSX until some injury could 
be shown, CSX could not seek reimbursement under the policy until liability and costs 
were actually incurred. See, e.g., In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 
1986) (M[A] debt is incurred when a debtor first becomes legally obligated to pay . . . ."); 
Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997) (holding 
cause of action did not accrue until damages were incurred and stating, "The true test 
16CSX gave SAIC the right to enforce CSX's forebearance from pursuing its 
claims. CSX did not unilaterally choose to forebear enforcement and thus was not 
"merely exercising a pre-existing right." (Appellant's Br. at 14.) 
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in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when 
the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.'") (citation 
omitted); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 & n.3 (Utah 1981) (M[T]he general rule is 
that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action."). 
Consequently, the record is clear that the trial court correctly concluded that the 
payments were for new consideration. 
2. The Consideration Given by CSX Was "Contemporaneous." 
The consideration given by CSX was clearly contemporaneous. The payments 
were required to be made in the very document securing the benefit for SAIC, and the 
payments were made shortly thereafter as each debt was incurred and as SAIC 
secured the right to enforce the Agreement. Because SAIC received the benefit of the 
Agreement and the corresponding enhancement to its net worth as the payments were 
made, no delay defeated the legitimate expectations of other creditors and the 
consideration was therefore contemporaneous. See PineTop Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am. 
Natl Trust &Sav.Ass'n.. 969 F.2d 321, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that transfers 
were contemporaneous under Illinois liquidation statute and therefore were not 
avoidable transfers): cf. In re Stephens, 242 B.R. 508, 511 & n.2 (D. Kan. 1999) 
(affirming ruling, in bankruptcy context, that exchange was contemporaneous and 
transfer not avoidable and stating that "'[contemporaneous' is defined as 'existing or 
occurring during the same time (as during a year, decade, or longer span of time)' or 
'originating, arising, or being formed or made at the same time: marked by 
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characteristics compatible with such origin.'") (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary (1961)). 
The Liquidator's argument that if a payment was for an antecedent debt it ipso 
facto is not contemporaneous consideration turns the statute on its head. As discussed 
below, these payments were payments on the debts created by the Agreement that 
were incurred as each payment came due, not for the original claims on the policies, 
and thus were not for antecedent debts. See infra, Part II.B. Further, even if they were 
on account of an antecedent debt, that inquiry is only a prima facie requirement for 
classifying a payment as a "preference." Although there is overlap between the two 
concepts, once a payment is classified as a preference, the statute still allows a 
defense to avoidance if, although on account of an antecedent debt, it is made for new 
and contemporaneous consideration. Hence, the Liquidator's analysis must be rejected 
because it would effectively repeal this statutory defense in its entirety. See Schurtz v. 
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991) (rejecting interpretation of 
statute that would effectively read out another subpart of statute and stating "the 
general rule that we should construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all 
their terms, where possible"). 
Finally, even assuming that the cases on which the Liquidator relies to argue the 
consideration was not contemporaneous interpreted the same language used by the 
Utah Insurance Code, they are factually inapposite and do not stand for the proposition 
that a formalized enforceable agreement to release existing and future claims and 
accept sums lower than those currently due cannot constitute new and 
contemporaneous consideration. In each case, the payments at issue were made on 
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an old debt whereas SAIC's payments were made for a new bargain. In particular, the 
Liquidator's reliance on In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc. is misplaced because there the 
creditor merely delayed its suit temporarily, providing no other value to the debtor, 
whereas here there was an express agreement wherein SAIC specifically bargained for 
the forebearance and other consideration. See In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. at 
376; see also In re Barefoot, 952 F.2d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding subsequent 
payment to make good a bad check, without such payment being required by 
subsequent settlement agreement containing new consideration, was not a 
contemporaneous exchange); In re Pan Trading Corp., 125 B.R. 869, 875-76 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding, without addressing contemporaneity, that payment on debt 
was not for new value in case where no subsequent settlement agreement was 
entered). 
In sum, the Liquidator's arguments that the consideration was not 
contemporaneous are without merit. The payments by SAIC were clearly made for new 
and contemporaneous consideration given to SAIC and the trial court therefore 
correctly granted summary judgment for CSX. Accordingly, this Court should affirm. 
D. The Court Correctly Ruled the Payments Were for New and 
Contemporaneous Consideration Without an Appraisal of the Future 
Claims Released by CSX. 
This Court should reject the Liquidator's argument that an appraisal is required to 
find new and contemporaneous consideration under section 31A-27-321(4)(a) of the 
Utah Code. (Appellant's Br. Part IV.) The Liquidator cites no Utah authority to support 
his argument, including the statute itself. Again, the statute provides, "The receiver 
may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for or because of: (a) a new and 
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contemporaneous consideration . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4). The Code 
simply contains no requirement that the consideration exchanged be appraised and 
weighed by a court to assess whether, in the court's view, it was sufficient to justify the 
exchange. Such weighing of the sufficiency of consideration by a court is inappropriate. 
See In re Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1351; Dementas, 764 P.2d at 632. Under 
Utah's Insurance Code, the question is only if there is consideration, not how much. 
The bankruptcy cases relied upon by the Liquidator are inapposite as interpreting 
distinct language of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code provides, "The trustee 
may not avoid under this section a transfer - (1) to the extent that such transfer was -
intended . . . to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value . . . ." 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 547(c) (West 1993) (emphasis added). Clearly, under this language, Congress 
requires bankruptcy courts to assess how much new value was provided to a debtor in 
exchange for a transfer. The language explicitly provides that a preference is insulated 
from avoidance only to the extent of the new value; the Utah Code has no 
corresponding provision. In distinction, the Utah Code asks only the yes or no question: 
Was the transfer for consideration? If the answer is yes, as it is here, the transfer may 
not be voided. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that CSX gave new and 
contemporaneous consideration and that the payments may not be avoided as a matter 
of law notwithstanding the absence of an appraisal. Consequently, this Court should 
affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX. 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CSX IS WARRANTED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW UPON THE REMAINING GROUNDS ASSERTED BY CSX BELOW. 
The trial court correctly determined the payments to CSX were for new and 
contemporaneous consideration. Nonetheless, this Court should affirm the grant of 
summary judgment also based upon the additional grounds raised by CSX below. It is 
well settled that this Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." Higqins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Moreover, for this Court to do so, it is not 
necessary for CSX to have brought a cross-appeal. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Able 
Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69,1J7, 983 P.2d 575. Consequently, summary judgment should 
be affirmed because the payments to CSX were (a) made within forty-five days after a 
debt was incurred, for a debt incurred in the ordinary course of SAIC's insurance 
business, and for a debt incurred according to normal business terms; and (b) not for 
an antecedent debt. 
A. The Payments May Not Be Avoided Because They Were Made In The 
Ordinary Course Of SAIC's Insurance Business As Payment Of Debts 
Within Forty-Five Days Of Their Incurrence And According To Normal 
Business Terms. 
The liquidator may not avoid the payments because they were made within forty-
five days after the debts were incurred, they were made for debts incurred in the 
ordinary course of SAIC's insurance business, and because they were incurred 
according to normal business terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(b) (1999). 
Section 31A-27-321 of the Utah Insurance Code provides that the Liquidator 
"may not avoid a transfer" of "the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a 
debt incurred in the ordinary course of the business of the insurer and according to 
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normal business terms." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4)(b) (1996). Because SAIC's 
payments to CSX meet each of these elements, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover 
them and this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX. 
First, each payment was made within forty-five days of the date it was due under 
the Agreement. A debt is "incurred" as of the date the debtor is legally obligated to pay 
it. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Pan Trading 
Corp., 125 B.R. at 875; In re Caceres Johnson P. R., 91 B.R. 200, 202 (D.P.R. 1988); 
In re Energy COOP.. 103 B.R. 171, 174 (N.D. III. 1986). In In re White River, the 10th 
Circuit examined the similar exception in the Bankruptcy Code17 to determine when 
debts for monthly payments due under a lease were incurred. The court rejected the 
trustee's argument that the entire debt was incurred upon execution of the lease. As 
the court stated: "[T]he debt was not incurred when the lease obligation was executed 
because the total lease obligation was not then due and payable. We hold that the 
debts were incurred under the lease in monthly increments on the actual dates the rent 
was due." In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633. 
Similarly here, the debts were not incurred when the policies were issued nor 
when a potential claimant was exposed to asbestos because under the policies' terms 
SAIC had no obligation to make payment until CSX had actually incurred liability and 
expenses with respect to each individual claimant. Further, the debts were not incurred 
upon the signing of the Agreement because SAIC was not then obligated to pay. 
17The 45 day requirement was removed from the Bankruptcy Code by a 1984 
amendment. The In re White River Corp. court considered the statute in effect before 
that amendment. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 632 (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
547(c)(2)(B) (1982)). 
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Rather, the debts for which the payments were made were incurred when actually due 
under the Agreement. Thus, under the terms of the Agreement, SAIC incurred debts to 
CSX on October 31, 1991, November 30, 1991 and December 31, 1991. See also In re 
Gold Coast Seed Co., 751 F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Iowa Premium Serv.. 
695 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc). SAIC met its legal obligations and 
made the payments of the debts on October 28, 1991, November 26, 1991 and 
January 2, 1992, respectively, clearly within the forty-five-day limit imposed by the 
insurance code. See In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633 (holding "that a transfer 
occurs upon delivery of the check."); see also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 402 
n.9, 112 S.Ct. 1386, 1391 n.9 (1992) (noting "[t]hose Courts of Appeals to have 
considered the issue are unanimous in concluding that a date of delivery rule should 
apply to check payments for purposes of § 547(c)"). Consequently, SAIC paid each of 
its three debts to CSX within forty-five days after incurring them. 
Further, even if the debt arose upon entry of the Agreement, the first two 
payments are not avoidable as being made within forty-five days after the debt was 
incurred. The payments were not made for the original claims brought by CSX; such 
claims were enforceably abandoned when CSX entered the Agreement with SAIC. 
Rather, the payments were made upon the Agreement dated October 14, 1991. To 
form a contract there must be "'[a]n acceptance [that] unconditionally assent[s] to all 
material terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance/" 
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100,^27, 989 P.2d 1077. 
Unconditional assent to all material terms did not occur until execution of the October 
14, 1991 letter. In the October 14, 1991 Agreement, signed by CSX on October 17, 
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1991 and by SAIC on October 25, 1991, the parties entered a formal settlement 
agreement resolving their claims and providing for payment on given days for fixed 
amounts. Consequently, at the earliest, the new debt arose on October 14, 1991. As a 
result, assuming the debts were incurred at that time, the two initial payments made 
October 28, 1991 and November 26, 1991 were made within forty-five days after the 
debt was incurred. 
Second, the debts were incurred and payments were made under the Agreement 
in the ordinary course of SAIC's business as an insurer. The "ordinary course of 
business" refers to a company's normal or standard business practices. SAIC, as an 
insurance company since 1934, has long been in the business of providing insurance 
coverage and making payments in settlement of the claims of its insureds. The 
settlement with CSX was no different than the no doubt thousands of similar 
settlements made by SAIC throughout its history. Thus, SAIC made the payments in 
the ordinary course of its business as an insurer. 
Debts pursuant to settlement agreements are not per se outside the ordinary 
course of business. While this may be true in the cases the Liquidator relied upon 
below wherein the debtor's ordinary course of business did not involve regularly paying 
disputed claims, it is not true in the insurance industry for which the heart of its ordinary 
course of business is to review, settle, and pay claims for insurance. See, e.g.. In re 
Valley Steel Prods. Co., 214 B.R. 202, 207 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (debt for unpaid taxes was 
not in steel company's ordinary course of business); In re Florence Tanners, Inc., 184 
B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (settlement for sexual discrimination lawsuit 
was not within ordinary course of debtor's business). Rather, determining whether a 
30 
debt was incurred in the ordinary course of business requires an examination of the 
practices in that particular industry; merely because a debt is not typically incurred by 
most industries does not foreclose it from being incurred in the ordinary course of 
business with the individual industry at issue. See Fidelity Sav. & Inv. Co. v. New Hope 
Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 1989). Hence, because SAIC was in the 
insurance business and the insurance business necessarily entails evaluating claims by 
insureds, settling those claims, and making payments on those new debts incurred 
through settlement, the debts here were clearly incurred in the ordinary scope of SAIC's 
business. 
Finally, the debts were incurred and payments were made according to normal 
business terms. In this case, the Agreement, the negotiations between SAIC and CSX 
as evidenced by the parties' correspondence, and the payments themselves indicate 
nothing other than a regular, fair and proper settlement. See Fidelity Sav. & Inv. Co. v. 
New Hope Baptist. 880 F.2d 1172, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1989) (transfers not voidable 
under Bankruptcy Code; they were "conducted in a regular manner, pursuant to the 
terms of the certificates, and without any indication that the corporation was having 
financial difficulties"). Again, because an insurance company is engaged in the 
business of reviewing claims, settling claims, and making payments for debts 
established through such settlement agreements, the payments here were necessarily 
within the normal terms of those engaged in by SAIC. At a minimum, they were within 
the permissible range necessary to establish that the payments may not be avoided. 
See In re Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 220 (3rd Cir. 1994) ("'"[OJrdinary 
business terms" refers to the range of terms that encompasses the practices in which 
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firms similar in some general way to the creditor in question engage and that only 
dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range should be deemed 
extraordinary and therefore outside the scope of [normal business terms]."') (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). The payments were made exactly as provided for in the 
Agreement, and it is plain that normal business terms were followed in the Agreement. 
In sum, because SAIC made the payments in the ordinary course of its 
insurance business, according to normal business terms and within forty-five days of 
incurring its debts to CSX, as a matter of law, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover 
the payments. Consequently, on this independent ground, this Court should affirm the 
grant of summary judgment for CSX. 
B. The Payments May Not Be Avoided Because They Were Not For An 
Antecedent Debt. 
Finally, the Liquidator may not avoid or recover the payments because the 
payments were made as settlement of claims, including future claims, and were not 
made on account of any antecedent debt. For a payment to be avoidable under the 
Utah Insurance Code, it must have been "for or on account of an antecedent debt." 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(1)(a) (1996). If not made to satisfy such antecedent or 
pre-existing debt, the payment is not a "preference" as defined by the statute and is not 
avoidable or recoverable. See id. It is undisputed that the terms of the Agreement 
release SAIC from liability "for any losses due to Asbestos-Related Claims past, 
present, or future, whether or not asserted in the coverage suits." By its plain terms, the 
Agreement incorporates a release of future claims - that is, claims that have not yet 
arisen, could not yet have arisen, and may never in fact actually arise. No stretch of 
logic could make such contingent, unrealized potential claims into "antecedent debt" 
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within the meaning of the statute. Such potential claims cannot be pre-existing and are 
thus not "antecedent."18 Therefore, the payments were not made for any antecedent 
debt and thus are not preferential transfers. 
The Liquidator erroneously asserts that the payments were made for an 
antecedent debt. In arguing the payments were not for contemporaneous 
consideration, the Liquidator argues that the debts arose when CSX first had a claim for 
payment against SAIC although such claim may be contingent, unmatured, or 
unliquidated. Even assuming the debts were based solely on the original policy, the 
payments here were not made for any debt thereunder. Rather, the payments were 
made in satisfaction of the debt created by the Agreement. 
In Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648 (3rd Cir. 1990), the debtor entered a 
settlement agreement with a creditor regarding a debt for work it performed. See id. at 
649. The creditor agreed to discontinue suit, remove a lis pendens, and make a 
payment. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the payment. kL The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, concluded that the payment does not meet the statutory preference 
requirements because "it was not 'for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the 
debtor before such transfer was made.'" jd. at 650 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2)). 
Consequently, the court determined that the settlement agreement, in exchange for the 
18The Liquidator asserts that because CSX is within the definition of a "creditor" 
any payment must have been for an antecedent debt. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) In fact, 
however, there is no connection between the two; the statute separately defines a 
creditor and what constitutes a preference and does not provide that any payment is for 
an antecedent debt merely because it was made to a creditor. Rather, the statute 
requires examination of the particular payments at issue and whether they were 
specifically for an antecedent debt. Hence, even if CSX's original claims under the 
policy can be considered antecedent debt, the payments here were not for that debt but 
rather for the new Agreement wherein CSX released future claims. 
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payment, gave the debtor freedom from the risk of litigation and an increase in the 
value of his property when the lis pendens was lifted. See id. Thus, there was no 
antecedent debt from which it sprung, but rather, the old debt was cancelled and the 
settlement agreement formed a new debt which was satisfied by the payment. See id. 
Similarly here, the original claims under the policy were canceled via the Agreement 
and the Agreement gave rise to new debts the payment of which do not constitute 
preferences.19 See also In re Anthony Sicari, Inc., 144 B.R. 656, 662 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (holding payment was not a preference because it was "not payment on an 
antecedent debt, but in settlement of pending litigation"). 
This principle is underscored by viewing statutes of limitation. When a party 
brings suit on a claim but then enters into a settlement agreement, dismissing his suit 
with prejudice, another subsequent suit for breach of that settlement agreement is not 
barred simply because the original limitation period has ended. Rather, because that 
person would have a new action under the settlement agreement for its breach by 
failure to pay the debt created by the settlement agreement, the person may chose 
either to rescind the agreement (provided the limitations period has not run and he can 
still sue on the original claim) or he may sue under the new agreement within its new 
limitations period. See Butcher v. Gilrov, 744 P.2d 311, 312-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
19The Liquidator correctly notes "'that a debt is incurred when a debtor first 
becomes legally obligated to pay . . . ."' (Appellant's Br. at 20 n.5 (quoting In re White 
River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986)).) Because SAIC could not have been 
obligated to pay claims for CSX's losses on then-unknown potential cases, such 
obligations did not exist before the Agreement and thus cannot be considered 
antecedent. 
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(holding that action for breach of settlement agreement accrued at time the terms of the 
agreement were breached). 
Accordingly, it is clear that the debts for which SAIC made the payments were 
newly incurred through the Agreement when they came due under the Agreement. The 
payments, therefore, were not for antecedent debts and thus cannot be avoided by the 
trustee. Consequently, on this independent ground, this Court should affirm the grant 
of summary judgment for CSX. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REMAND FOR ENTRY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE LIQUIDATOR. 
The Liquidator erroneously asserts that acceptance of his arguments requires 
remand for entry of summary judgment in his favor. (Appellant's brief at 10.) As 
explained above, however, even if this Court determines the trial court erred with 
respect to the new and contemporaneous consideration defense, this Court should still 
affirm summary judgment on the additional grounds raised by CSX below. In the event, 
however, this Court also rejects those grounds, the case should be remanded without 
direction to enter summary judgment in the Liquidator's favor so that the trial court may 
address the issues not previously reached. Indeed, the denial of the Liquidator's 
motion alone would not be a final order within the purview of this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. See Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 
1977); R.F. Chase, Annotation, Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 15 A.L.R. 3d 899, at 902-03 (1967 & Supp. 2001) (and authority cited 
therein) ("The vast majority of cases that have ruled upon the question whether an 
order denying a motion for summary judgment is reviewable by appeal or writ of error 
have held against such review."). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment for CSX. First, the trial 
court correctly ruled that the Agreement provided new and contemporaneous 
consideration as a matter of law and that this forecloses the Liquidator's ability to avoid 
the payments. Further, this Court should affirm upon the alternate grounds raised 
below. That is, summary judgment was proper because the payments were received 
for debts incurred in the ordinary course of business within forty-five days of being 
incurred and according to normal business terms. Further, the payments were for debts 
arising via the Agreement that were incurred as each payment became due, and thus 
were not transfers pursuant to an antecedent debt and are not preferences within the 
scope of the statute. 
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History: C. 1953, 31A-26-302, enacted by ment, effective April 30, 2001, made a stylistic 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 31; 2001, ch. 116, § 174. change in Subsection (3 \ 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
31A-26-303. Unfair claim settlement practices. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Const ruct ion and application. action. Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 
This section and the rules promulgated un- UT App 10, 994 R2d 824, cert, denied, 4 R3d 
der it do not give rise to a private cause of 1289 (Utah 2000). 
CHAPTER 27 
INSURERS REHABILITATION AND 
LIQUIDATION 
General Provisions 
Part I Section 
31A-27-310. Liquidation orders. 
31A-27-311.5. Continuance of coverage — 
Section Health maintenance organi-
31A-27-102. Definitions. zations. 
31A-27-104. Injunctions and orders. 31A-27-323. Setoffs. 
31A-27-110. Immunity and indemnifica- 31A-27-328. Filing of claims, 
tion of the receiver. 31A-27-332. Disputed claims. 
Part III 31A-27-335. Priority of distribution. 
Formal Proceedings 
31A-27-307. Grounds for liquidation. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
31A-27-101. Scope, purpose, and construction. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Davister Corp. v. United Republic cert, denied, 525 U.S. 1177, 119 S. Ct. 1112,143 
Life Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 1998), L. Ed. 2d 108 (1999). 
31A-27-102. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Alien insurer domiciled in Utah" means an insurer domiciled 
outside the United States whose entry into the United States is through 
Utah. 
(b) "Ancillary state" means any state other than an insurer's state of 
domicile. 
(c) "Contingent claims" means a claim or demand upon which: 
(i) a right of action has accrued at the date of the order of 
liquidation; and 
(ii) liability has not been determined. 
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(d) "Date of liquidation*' means the date of the filing of a petition for 
liquidation that results in an order for liquidation. 
(e) "Delinquency proceeding" means any: 
(i) proceeding commenced against an insurer for the purpose of 
liquidating, rehabilitating, reorganizing, or conserving the insurer; 
and 
(ii) summary proceeding under Sections 31A-27-201 through 31A-
27-203. 
(f) "Domestic insurer" includes, for puiposes of this chapter, foreign 
insurers commercially domiciled in this state under Section 31 A-14-206. 
(g) (i) "Estate" or "property of the estate" means: 
(A) all legal or equitable interests of an insurer that are the 
subject of a rehabilitation, liquidation, conservation, or other 
proceeding under this chapter in property as of the date of filing 
of the petition for rehabilitation, liquidation, or conservation; 
(B) any interest in property recoverable by the receiver under 
the provisions of this title; 
(C) any interest in property acquired after the date of filing of 
the petition; and 
(D) all proceeds, products, rents, and profits from this property, 
(ii) "Estate" or "property of the estate" includes property in which 
the insurer holds only legal title, but no equitable interest, only to the 
extent of the insolvent insurer's interest, 
(h) "Fair consideration" is given for property or an obligation: 
(i) when in exchange for the property or obligation, as a fair 
equivalent for it, and in good faith: 
(A) property is conveyed; 
(B) services are rendered; 
(C) an obligation is incurred; or 
(D) an antecedent debt is satisfied; or 
(ii) when the property or obligation is received in good faith to 
secure a present advance or an antecedent debt in amount not 
disproportionately small compared to the value of the property or 
obligation obtained, 
(i) (i) "General assets" means all property not encumbered by a security 
agreement for the security or benefit of specified persons or classes of 
persons. 
(ii) "General assets" does not include separate account assets under 
Section 31A-5-217. 
(iii) For encumbered property, "general assets" includes all t h a t , 
property or its proceeds which is in excess of the amount necessary to 
discharge the sums secured by the property. 
(iv) Assets held in trust or on deposit for the security or benefit of 
all policyholders, or all policyholders and creditors, in more than a 
single state, are general assets, 
(j) "Guaranty association" means: 
(i) the applicable association under Chapter 28; or 
(ii) the similar association under the laws of another state, 
(k) "Immature claim" means a claim or demand upon which payment is 
due, except for the passage of time. 
(1) "Insolvency" has the same meaning as in Section 31A-1-30L 
(m) "Insurer" means any person who is doing, has done, purports to do, 
or is licensed to do an insurance business on its own account and is or has 
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been subject to the authority of, or to liquidation, rehabilitation, reorga-
nization, or supervision by, a commissioner. A separate account created 
under Section 31A-5-217 is an "insurer" for purposes of Chapter 27, 
(n) "Preferred claim" means any claim that the law gives priority of 
payment from the general assets of the insurer 
(o) "Receiver" means receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator, or conservator, 
as the context requires. 
(p) "Reciprocal state" means any state other than this state: 
(i) in which in substance Subsection 31A-27-310(l), Subsections 
31A-27-403U) and (3), Sections 31A-27-404 and 31A-27-406 through 
31A-27-409 are in force; 
(iD which has laws requiring the commissioner to be the receiver of 
a delinquent insurer; and 
(iii) which has laws for the avoidance of fraudulent conveyances 
and preferential transfers by the receiver of a delinquent insurer. 
(q) "Secured claim" means any claim secured by mortgage, trust deed, 
security agreement, pledge, deposit as security, escrow or otherwise, but 
not including special deposit claims. The term also includes claims that 
have become liens upon specific assets through judicial processes. 
(r) "Separate account assets" means those assets allocated to separate 
accounts under Section 31A-5-217. 
(s) "Special deposit claim" means any claim secured by a deposit in trust 
made pursuant to this title for the security or benefit of one or more 
limited classes of persons. 
(t) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, of 
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property. The 
retention of a security interest in or title to property delivered to a debtor 
is considered a transfer by the debtor. 
(u) "Unliquidated claim" means a claim or demand upon which: 
(i) a right of action has accrued at the date of the order of 
liquidation; and 
(ii) liability has been established but the amount of which has not 
been determined. 
(2) If the subject of a rehabilitation or liquidation proceeding under this 
chapter is an insurer engaged in a surety business, then as used in this 
chapter: 
(a) "Policy" includes a bond issued by a surety. 
(b) "Policyholder" includes a principal on a bond. 
(c) "Beneficiary" includes an obligee of a bond. 
(d) "Insured" includes both the principal and obligee of a bond. 
History: C. 1953, 31 A-27-102, enacted by ment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted uSec-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 222; tion 31A-l-30r for "Subsection 31A-1-30K39)" 
1996 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 55: 1999, ch. 131, in Subsection (1X1), designated subsections, 
§ 26. and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
31A-27-104. Injunctions and orders, 
(1) Any receiver appointed in a proceeding under this chapter may, at any 
time, apply for and any court of general jurisdiction in this state may grant, 
under the relevant provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any 
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purposes of Subsection (2) if the lien or purchase superiority can be 
obtained only through acts subsequent to the obtaining of the lien or 
subsequent to the purchase which require the agreement or concurrence of 
any third party or which require any further judicial action or ruling. 
(4) Any transaction of the insurer with a reinsurer is considered fraudulent 
and may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the transaction consists of the termination, adjustment, or settle-
ment of a reinsurance contract in which the reinsurer is released from any 
part of its duty to pay the originally specified share of losses that had 
occurred prior to the time of the transaction, unless the reinsurer gives a 
present fair consideration for the release; and 
(b) any part of the transaction took place within one year prior to the 
date of filing of the petition pursuant to which the rehabilitation or 
liquidation was commenced. 
(5) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after 
the earlier of: 
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section 
31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or 
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27-
306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-320, enacted by Cross-References. — Uniform Fraudulent 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 238. Transfer Act, Title 25, Chapter 6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of secured creditor to have 
set aside fraudulent transfer of other property 
by his debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123. 
31A-27-321. Voidable preferences and liens, 
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any of the 
property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account 
of an antecedent debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one year 
before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation 
under this chapter, the effect of which transfer may enable the creditor to 
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor of the same 
class would receive. If a liquidation order is entered while the insurer is 
already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers otherwise qualifying 
are considered to be preferences if they are made or allowed within one 
year before the filing of the successful petition for rehabilitation or within 
two years before the filing of the successful petition for liquidation, 
whichever time is shorter. 
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, if: 
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer; 
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing of 
the petition; 
(Hi) the creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it or his agent 
acting with reference to the transfer had, at the time when the 
transfer was made, reasonable cause to believe that the insurer was 
or was about to become insolvent; or 
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(iv) the creditor receiving it was an officer, an employee, an attor-
ney, or other person who was in fact in a position of comparable 
influence in the insurer to an officer, or any shareholder holding 
directly or indirectly more than 5% of any class of equity security 
issued by the insurer, or any other person with whom the insurer did 
not deal at arm's length. 
(c) Where the preference is voidable, the rehabilitator or liquidator may 
recover the property or, if it has been converted, its value, from any person 
who has received or converted the property, except that he may not recover 
from a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's transferee for a 
present fair consideration. Where a bona fide purchaser or lienor has given 
less than fair consideration, the bona fide purchaser or lienor has a lien 
upon the property to the extent of the consideration actually given by him. 
Where a preference by way of lien or security title is voidable, the court 
may, on due notice, order the lien or title to be preserved for the benefit of 
the estate, in which event the lien or title passes to the liquidator. 
(d) Any payment to which Subsection 31A-5-415(2) applies is a prefer-
ence and is voidable under Subsection (l)(b) if it is made within the time 
period specified in Subsection (l)(a), except that payments made by 
insurers for the purchase of insurance under Section 16-10a-302 are not 
preferences. 
(2) Subsection 31A-27-320(2) applies to the perfection of transfers. 
(3) Subsection 31A-27-320(3) applies to liens by legal or equitable proceed-
ings. 
(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this section for 
or because of: 
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration; 
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a debt 
incurred in the ordinary course of the business of the insurer and 
according to normal business terms; 
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable the insurer to 
acquire the property and which is perfected within ten days after the 
security interest attaches; 
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent that after 
the transfer, the creditor gave new value not secured by an unavoidable 
security interest and on account of which the insurer did not make an 
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of the creditor; or 
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable 
or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all of 
those types of transfers to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount 
by which the debt secured by the security interest exceeded the value of 
the security interest four months prior to the date of liquidation or any 
time subsequent to the liquidation. 
(5) The receiver may avoid a transfer of property of the insurer transferred 
to secure reimbursement of a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation 
to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the receiver under 
Subsection (l)(b). The liability of the surety under the bond or obligation shall 
be discharged to the extent of the value of the property recovered by the 
receiver or the amounts paid to the receiver. 
(6) The property affected by any lien which is considered voidable under 
Subsection (l)(b) and Subsection (5) is discharged from the lien, and that 
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property and any of the indemnifying property transferred to or for the benefit 
of a surety passes to the rehabihtator or liquidator, except that the court may, 
on due notice, order the lien to be preserved for the benefit of the estate and the 
court may direct that a conveyance be executed which is adequate to evidence 
the title of the rehabihtator or liquidator. 
(7) The court has jurisdiction of any proceeding by the rehabihtator or 
liquidator, to hear and determine the rights of any parties under this section. 
Reasonable notice of any hearing in the proceeding shall be given to all parties 
in interest, including the obligee of a releasing bond or other similar obligation. 
Where an order is entered for the recovery of indemnifying property in kind or 
for the avoidance of an indemnifying lien, the court, upon application of any 
party in interest, shall in the same proceeding ascertain the value of the 
property or lien, and if the value is less than the amount for which the property 
is indemnity or than the amount of the lien, the transferee or lienholder may 
elect to retain the property or lien upon payment of its value, as ascertained by 
the court, to the rehabihtator or liquidator within those reasonable times as 
fixed by the court. 
(8) The liability of a surety under a releasing bond or other similar 
obligation is discharged to the extent of the value of the indemnifying property 
recovered or the indemnifying lien nullified and avoided or, where the property 
is retained under Subsection (7) to the extent of the amount paid to the 
rehabihtator or liquidator. 
(9) If a creditor has been preferred and afterward in good faith gives the 
insurer further credit without security of any kind, for property which becomes 
a part of the insurer's estate, the amount of the new credit remaining unpaid 
at the time of the petition shall be setoff against the preference which would 
otherwise be recoverable from him. 
(10) If an insurer, directly or indirectly, within four months before the filing 
of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation under this chapter or at 
any time in contemplation of a proceeding to rehabilitate or liquidate it, pays 
money or transfers property to an attorney at law for services rendered or to be 
rendered, the transaction may be examined b}' the court on its own motion or 
shall be examined by the court on petition of the rehabihtator or liquidator and 
shall be held valid only to the extent the transfer is a reasonable amount as 
determined by the court. The excess may be recovered by the rehabihtator or 
liquidator for the benefit of the estate. If the attorney meets the description in 
Subsection (l)(b)(iv), that subsection applies in place of this subsection. 
(11) (a) Every officer, manager, employee, shareholder, member, subscriber, 
attorney, or any other person acting on behalf of the insurer who 
knowingly participates in giving any preference wThen he has reasonable 
cause to believe the insurer is or is about to become insolvent at the time 
of the preference, is personally liable to the rehabihtator or liquidator for 
the amount of the preference. It is permissible to infer that there is 
reasonable cause to so believe if the transfer was made within four months 
before the date of filing the successful petition for rehabilitation or 
liquidation. 
(b) Every person receiving any property from the insurer or for the 
benefit of the insurer as a preference which is voidable under Subsection 
(1Kb) is personally liable for that transfer and property and is bound to 
account to the rehabihtator or liquidator. 
(c) This subsection does not prejudice any other claim by the rehabih-
tator or liquidator against any person. 
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History: C. 1953, 31A-27-321, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 239; 
1987, ch. 166, § 9; 1992, ch. 277, § 240. 
31A-27-322. Recoupment from affiliates. 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an 
insurer authorized to do business in this state is ordered under this chapter, 
the receiver appointed under the order has a right to recover on behalf of the 
insurer from any affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distribu-
tions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, made 
at any time during the five years preceding the petition for liquidation, 
rehabilitation, or conservation. This recovery is subject to the limitations of 
Subsections (2) through (6). 
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that, when paid, the 
distribution was lawful and reasonable, and that the insurer did not know and 
could not reasonably have known that the distribution might adversely affect 
its solvency. 
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is the amount 
needed, in excess of all other available assets, to pay all claims under the 
receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has 
already paid to receivers under similar laws of other states. 
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time 
the distributions were paid is liable up to the amount of distributions he 
received. Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the 
time the distributions were declared is liable up to the amount of distributions 
he would have received if they had been paid immediately. If two or more 
persons are liable regarding the same distributions, they are jointly and 
severally liable. 
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all affiliates that 
controlled that person at the time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly 
and severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from 
the insolvent affiliate. 
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a director under 
existing law. 
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after 
the earlier of: 
(a) two years after the appointment of a rehabilitator under Section 
31A-27-303 or a liquidator under Section 31A-27-310; or 
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under Subsection 31A-27-
306(2) or the liquidation is terminated under Section 31A-27-339. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-322, enacted by 322, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch 242, § 32, 
L. 1986, ch. 204, § 240. relating to recovery from affiliates of excessive 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws contributions, and enacted present § 31A-27-
1986, ch 204, § 240 repealed former § 31A-27- 322, effective July 1, 1986. 
31A-27-323. Setoffs. 
(1) Mutual debts or mutual credits between the insurer and another person 
in connection with any action or proceeding under this chapter shall be set off 
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creation and maintenance of the deposits. If there is a deficiency in any deposit 
so that the claims secured by it are not fully discharged from it, the claimants 
may claim against a guaranty fund or association or may share in the general 
assets, but the claim shall be limited and the sharing shall be deferred until 
the general creditors having the same priority, and also the claimants against 
other special deposits sharing the same priority who have received smaller 
percentages from their respective special deposits, have been paid percentages 
of their claims equal to the percentage paid from the special deposit. 
(3) The owner of a secured claim against an insurer for which a liquidator 
has been appointed in this state or any other state may surrender the security 
for the claim and file the claim as a general creditor, or the claim may be 
discharged by resort to the security in accordance with Section 31A-27-334, in 
which case the deficiency, if any, shall be treated as a claim against the general 
assets of the insurer on the same basis as claims of unsecured creditors. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-409, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 249. 
31A-27-410. Subordination of claims for noncooperation. 
If an ancillary receiver in another state or foreign country, whether called an 
ancillary receiver or not, fails to transfer to the domiciliary liquidator in Utah 
any assets within his control other than special deposits, diminished only by 
the expenses of the ancillary receivership, if any, then the claims filed in the 
ancillary receivership, or with the guaranty fund or association in that 
jurisdiction, other than special deposit claims or secured claims, shall be 
placed in the class six of claims under Section 31A-27-335. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-27-410, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1995, ch. 344, § 38. 
31A-27-41L Severability clause. 
If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circum-
stance is found to be unconstitutional, or in conflict with or superseded by the 
federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. Section 101 et seq., as 
amended, the remainder of the chapter and the application of the provision to 
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by it. 
History: € . 1953, 31A-27-411, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 32; 1986, ch. 204, § 250. 
CHAPTER 28 
GUARANTY ASSOCIATIONS 
Utah Life and Disability Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act 
Part I Section 
31A-28-103. Coverage and limitations. 
31A-28-104. Construction. 
31A-28-105. Definitions. 
Section 31A-28-106. Continuation of the associa-
31A-28-101. Short title. tion—Association duties — 
31A-28-102. Purpose. Allocation of assessments. 
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178. Commencement of case occurred after SEC filed action against 
Bankruptcy section limiting avoidance brokerage pursuant to which receiver 
powers with respect to settlement pay- was appointed, date which court had 
ments made before commencement of held to be date of commencement of 
case did not apply to trustee's action to
 c a s e M a t t e r o f B e v i]I , Bresler & Schul-
recover transferred c e r t i f i e s of depos-
 m ^ , D . N J . 1 9 8 8 f 8 3 B.R. 880. 
its or their proceeds, where transfer had 
§ 5 4 7 . Preferences 
(a) In this section— 
(1) "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished, 
held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for 
service, raw materials, vvork in process, or materials used or 
consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops 
or livestock, held for sale or lease; 
(2) "new value" means money or money's worth in goods, 
services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property 
previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is 
neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any 
applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does 
not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation; 
(3) "receivable" means right to payment, whether or not such 
right has been earned by performance; and 
(4) a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is 
last payable without penalty, including any extension. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the 
trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property— 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the 
debtor before such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made— 
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of 
the petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of 
the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such 
transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such 
creditor would receive if— 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the 
extent provided by the provisions of this title. 
137 
11 §547 BANKRUPTCY Ch. 5 
(e) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer— 
(1) to the extent that such transfer was— 
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for 
whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contempora-
neous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; 
(2) to the extent that such transfer was— 
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the 
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and the transferee; 
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial 
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and 
(C) made according to ordinary business terms; 
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the 
debtor— 
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value 
that was— 
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agree-
ment that contains a description of such property as 
collateral; 
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under 
such agreement; 
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such prop-
erty; and 
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such prop-
erty; and 
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor 
receives possession of such property; 
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after 
such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit 
of the debtor— 
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security 
interest; and 
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not 
make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the 
benefit of such creditor; 
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a 
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that 
the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a 
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the 
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any 
amount by which the debt secured by such security interest 
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exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the 
later of— 
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection 
(b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of 
the filing of the petition; or 
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection 
(b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of 
the filing of the petition; or 
(B) the date on which new value was first given under 
the security agreement creating such security interest; 
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory hen that is not avoidable 
under section 545 of this title; or 
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are 
primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property 
that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600. 
(d) The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of 
the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure 
reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other 
obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable 
by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of 
such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to 
the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or 
the amount paid to the trustee. 
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section— 
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but includ-
ing the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the 
sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser 
of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law 
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest 
that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and 
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real proper-
ty is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot 
acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the 
transferee.
 N 
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in para-
graph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made— 
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or 
within 10 days after, such time; 
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is 
perfected after such 10 days; or 
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if 
such transfer is not perfected at the later of— 
11 USC A §§544 to 700—6 ] 3 9 
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(i) the commencement of the case; or 
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the 
transferor and the transferee. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until 
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. 
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to 
have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preced-
ing the date of the filing of the petition. 
(g) For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of 
proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this 
section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery 
or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidabili-
ty of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section. 
(Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2597; Pub.L. 98-353, Title III, §§ 310, 
462, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 355, 377; Pub.L. 99-554, Title II, § 283(m), Oct. 
27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3117.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1978 Acts. This section is a substantial 
modification of present law. It modern-
izes the preference provisions and brings 
them more into conformity with com-
mercial practice and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 
Subsection (a) contains three defini-
tions. Inventory, new value, and receiv-
able are defined in their ordinary senses, 
but are defined to avoid any confusion 
or uncertainty surrounding the terms. 
Subsection (b) is the operative provi-
sion of the section. It authorizes the 
trustee to avoid a transfer if five condi-
tions are met. These are the five ele-
ments of a preference action. First, the 
transfer must be to or for the benefit of 
a creditor. Second, the transfer must be 
for or on account of an antecedent debt 
owed by the debtor before the transfer 
was made. Third, the transfer must 
have been made when the debtor was 
insolvent. Fourth, the transfer must 
have been made during the 90 days im-
mediately preceding the commencement 
of the case. If the transfer was to an 
insider, the trustee may avoid the trans-
fer if it was made during the period that 
begins one year before the filing of the 
petition and ends 90 days before the 
filing, if the insider to whom the transfer 
was made had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor was insolvent at the time 
the transfer was made. 
Finally, the transfer must enable the 
creditor to whom or for whose benefit it 
was made to receive a greater percent-
age of his claim than he would receive 
under the distributive provisions of the 
bankruptcy code. Specifically, the credi-
tor must receive more than he would if 
the case were a liquidation case, if the 
transfer had not been made, and if the 
creditor received payment of the debt to 
the extent provided by the provisions of 
the code. 
The phrasing of the final element 
changes the application of the greater 
percentage test from that employed un-
der current law. Under this language, 
the court must focus on the relative dis-
tribution between classes as well as the 
amount that will be received by the 
members of the class of which the credi-
tor is a member. The language also 
requires the court to focus on the allow-
ability of the claim for which the prefer-
ence was made. If the claim would have 
been entirely disallowed, for example, 
then the test of paragraph (5) will be 
met, because the creditor would have 
received nothing under the distributive 
provisions of the bankruptcy code. 
The trustee may avoid a transfer of a 
lien under this section even if the lien 
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March 1 , 1991 
Sherry W. Gilbert, Esq. 
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky 
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Suite 7500 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Re: CSX Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Sherry: 
We have reviewed the allocations which you provided us 
in December. The two most recent allocations indicate that our 
prior estimates for Southern's potential liability were 
underestimated. This has caused us to reconsider our settlement 
position. However, in the interests of resolving this dispute 
quickly and economically, we are making a settlement offer based 
on the following considerations. 
The part of the settlement agreement which causes us 
the most concern is CSX's contribution to the asbestos Tosses. 
Based~on_our current projections, CSX will pay approximately $30 
million in asbestos losses. However, the self-insured" retentions 
under all the policies issued to CSX and its predecessor entities 
total well over $60 million. Thus, $30 million, in asbestos 
losses, will be allocated to the insurers which should be 
allocated to CSX. ~~ 
Another problem with the settlement agreement is the 
very high settlement: autmority given to CSX. BasecTon the 
statistics that we have seen so far, the average"~litigated claim 
has settled for $58,000. However, the settlemenf~agreement 
provides tor a $lbU,OUU/ciaim settlement authority. In effect, 
this means tnat no settlement will t>e reviewed py the Claims 
Handling AgentT Our concern over this provision in the 
settlement agreement is heightened by the fact that _a 
disproportionately large amount of the claims have been settled 
over the last two years. During these same two years, CSX's 
contribution to the asbestos losses has been limited to 10% of 
the total losses. Our concern is not limited to the settlement 
amounts over the last two years but also includes the fear that 
settlements will again be disproportionately greater in the last 
0 0 0 2 
Sherry W. Gilbert, Esquire 
March 1, 1991 
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few years of the settlement agreement. The very high settlement 
authority increases the chance that insurers will have to pay for 
claims which would not otherwise have come under the settlement 
agreement. 
Our current estimate for total asbestos losses is $130 L C C / 
million. Of that amount we expect $100 million to be allocated 
to the insurers. Based on prior allocations, we* expect 
Southern's portion of this amount to be .16% or, $160,000. 
Although the settlement agreement provides for the payment of 
this amount over time, given that this is a relatively small 
amount and that it would be costly to Southern to pay its 
obligations in small amounts every year, we propose that Southern 
pay a lump sum which is discounted to reflect the time value of 
money.' We," therefore, propose to settle the claims arrslnq out 
of the asbestos action for $100,000. This amount aiso"~Tncludes a 
reduction to account for the disproportionate allocation to the 
insurers of the asbestos losses. " ' * 
If you would like to discuss this proposal, I am 
available to meet at your convenience. 
ylOT ffHnnt2> /^ Robert E.'^ggestad 
REH/pdh *°**«*< 
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CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT 
CQHHUNICATION 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C. 
The Southern Building 
805 15th Street, N.W. 
Suite 600 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Re: CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Bob: 
CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT") has considered Southern 
American's settlement proposal set forth in your March 1, 1991 
letter to me and has the following response. 
Southern American's concerns with CSXTfs coverage-in-place 
settlement arrangement are unfounded. As I am certain you can 
appreciate, CSXT and the settling insurers differed on a number 
of issues and the settlement represents an overall compromise. 
Thus, focusing on specific issues in isolation can create an 
inaccurate perspective. However, Southern American's concerns 
warrant comment, even when viewed out of the context of the 
complete agreement. 
First, CSXT views its contribution to asbestos losses as 
more than adequate. Of the more than $98 million paid in 
asbestos losses to date, CSXT's contribution (excluding the 
amounts allocable under the agreement to non-settling insurers) 
has been approximately $22 million. This amount is comprised 
of the initial $10 million in losses absorbed by CSXT under the 
agreement, CSXTfs 10% to 20% share of the losses, and CSXT's 
Under certain constructions of the policy language, CSXTfs 
contribution would have been limited to a mere fraction of that 
amount. 
Oft 0 2.13 
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responsibility for the amounts that otherwise would be allocated 
to insolvent insurers. Currently, the insolvent insurers' shares 
represent approximately 4% of the first-layer coverage. 
Second, the settlement authority has not presented a problem 
for the settling insurers. CSXT has consulted with the Claims 
Handling Agent concerning settlement on numerous occasions and 
CSXT is confident that the settling insurers would confirm that 
CSXT has not abused its settlement authority. 
Thus, CSXT's offer to Southern American to sign onto the 
existing coverage-in-place settlement stands. If Southern 
American should decide to do so, its allocations through the 
Seventh Billing (through 9/30/90) total approximately §109,000. 
A copy of the Seventh Billing is enclosed for your information. 
If Southern American prefers a lump-sum settlement, CSXT is 
willing to entertain that approach. However, any such settlement 
must be based upon a more realistic amount than the $100,000 that 
Southern American has offered. According to CSXT's estimates for 
total asbestos losses, Southern American's share under the 
existing agreement's allocation method would approximate 
§387,500.00. CSXT does not share Southern American's view that a 
discount is appropriate, particularly since no interest has been 
computed on the amounts due from Southern American for asbestos 
losses dating back to the early 1980's. 
If you or your client would like to discuss either of these 
proposals further, please let me know. 
lerry/w. Gilbert 
SWG:ks 
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bcc: R. Templeton Fitch 
C- Keith Meiser 
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CBX MBSSTOS SETTLEMENT 
gg«KARY,Qr MPPlfM 
DPg TROK IKgraEKg 
4/l/?9 TO t/3?/?9 
Aetna $1,258,246.71 
All Star 14,843.02 
American Roma 98,243.48 
American Reinsurance 466,097.01 
Bellefonte 27,809.70 
California Union 1,234,025.61 
Casualty Insurance 1,854.74 
Continental Casualty 81,518.77 
Employers Surplus 409,698.18 
Federal Ins. 32,544.98 
First State 123,986.69 
General Reinsurance 279,360.29 
Glacier Ins. 40,847.53 
Harbor 7,584,023.31 
Home 87,946.79 
SW-El PaiO C"66,963.43, 
HSW-Kingscroft 123,462.32*, 
HSW-Louisville ". 53,009.89-
HSW-Hutual Re .62,342.83.; 
HSM-Othar 323,153.97 
Imperio 4,389.09 




Lloyd's & Cos. C*,Z56l_529i£9„ 
(Mentor 12,4 2 4~. 19 
Midland 3,709.48 
Mutual Fire 40,537.22 
North River 245,422.71 
Nationwide 121,353.86 
Pacific (Harbor) 127,589.91 
Seguros 6,027.91 
Signal 2,013.93 
Southern American 29,179.63 
St. Helens 42,176.96 





0 2 / 1 9 / 9 1 
p o l i c y 
IHSUR&R: SOUTHS* K.JRICAH 
Kendo. »*d *01^*
 r 
RelBburstbl. by Insurer 
CSX Railroad 
Yaar Rei»bur»abl« 
** Policy: XC860028 
** subtotal ** 
** policy: XG860092 
«* subtotal ** 
** Policy: XG860108 
** Subtotal ** 









ROOtRT C.HC0GC5TA0 fjWtJ682-40$* 
June 22, 1991 
Sherry W. G i l b e r t , Esq. 
Anderson, K i l l , Olick & Oshinsky 
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
S u i t e 7500 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Re: CSX Asbestos Coveraga Liticration 
Dear Sherry: 
Southern American has authorized me to respor-" 
letter at May 20, 1991 regarding its previous proposal 
lump-sum settlement of $100,000, Your counter-offer, * 
not reflect a present value discount, appears to be ba=^ 
estimate of the insurer's share of future asbestos losses 
approximately $191,408,000, -p 
It is our belief that the insurer's share of asbestos 
losses under~"the existing allocation formula wlll~hot exceed 
$lOQ/tfg5iO 00 during the remainder of the term of the "agreement. 
ThU3T"~wgr~&elleye that Southern American's projecjSed share, 
including^the_$109,000 allocated to date, should be approximately 
$254f500r"not $387,500. Regardless of whether or not CSX has 
computed interest on back amounts, there is unquestionably a 
certain present value premium which attaches to any large lump 
sum payment received in advance of the remaining 9 years during 
which this sum would be paid out under the settlement agreement• 
Under these circumstances, Southern American is willing to offer 
CSX $2l0,Q00as a lump sum settlement to dispose of this matter. 
Please call me if you would like to discuss this matter 
in greater detail. 
E« Heggestad 
REH/ddd 
cc: Mr, Max Levine 0 00 2 % 5 
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
Caseyr Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C. 
The Southern Building 
805 15th Street, N.W, 
Suite 600 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Re: CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Bob: 
CSXT has reviewed Southern American's recent settlement 
proposal as set forth in your June 22, 1991 letter to me. 
Initially, CSXT does not understand the basis for Southern 
Americanfs projection that its total share of asbestos losses 
during the term of the existing agreement with other insurers 
would amount to $254,500. If you can provide further support for 
this projection, perhaps it would be useful to CSXT's analysis. 
However, CSXT remains willing to accept a lump-sum 
settlement based upon its own projections of Southern American's 
share under the settlement agreement. As you are aware, the 
allocations to Southern American under the settlement agreement, 
through September 1990 (Bill No, 7), total $108,736.41/ and CSXT 
estimates that Southern American's future allocations would total 
$278,700 during the remainder of the term of the agreement. If 
those amounts are adjusted to account for interest accrued (from 
the date of billing) on past allocations and to account for the 
present value of future allocations, the total lump-sum payment 
acceptable to CSXT is $336,000. 
I look forward to your response. 
Sincerely, 
herry w. Gilbert 
0 0 0 2 E 9 
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Sherry W. Gilbert, Esq* 
Anderson, Kill/, olick & Oshinsky 
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Suite 7500 
Washington, D,C. 20006 
R»: CSX Asbestos Covtragi Litigation 
Dear Sherry I 
In our last conversation regarding settlement of this 
matter , y o t ^ r o \ ^ ^ the basis for 
CSX's rSroTection . ^ Although this 
information was quite helpful, unfortunately it does not allow 
Southern to predict with any great amount of certainty what the 
total claims will amount to during the next ten years. To 
resolve this issue, I am authorized to propose a compromise offar 
of one lump sum payment of $308,000. Please call me if you would 
like to discuss this matter further. 
Sincerely,. 
Robert E« Ifeggestad 
REH/pdh 
cc: . Max Levine 
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August 16; 1991 
Oharry W. Gilbert/ Esq. 
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky 
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Suite 7500 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Re: CSX Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Sherry: 
In my August 8, 1991 letter to you, I proposed a lump 
cum paymont of $3 08,000 to oettlc thie matter on behalf of 
Southern* Amerioan Insurance Company, This prapoaal is baaed e* 
payment schedule which would provide for the first 1/3 pay**--
due on October 31, 1991, &ro tho romaining 1/3 paymcnta due o<-
November 31, 1991 and December 31, 1991, Please call me if you 
would like to discuss either the amount or the payment schedule 
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 
SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C. 
The Southern Building 
805 15th Street, N.W. 
Suite 600 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Re: CSXT - Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Bob: 
CSXT has asked me to convey to you that it is willing to 
accept Southern American's offer of $308,000 to settle CSXT's 
asbestos coverage litigation. CSXT understands that Southern 
American will make the payment in three installations due on 
^October 31, November 30, and December 31, 1991, respectively. 
(I would suggest the first two payments be in the amount of 
$102,667 each and the last in the amount of $102,666.) 
Please provide me, for CSXT's review, with Southern 
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Tab 12 
ROBERT E.HEGGESTAD 
SOS fS/A ji~~t. sY. 7KJLA> 6co 
{202J 662-MOS2 
November 6, 1991 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Sherry w. Gilbert, Esq, 
Anderson, Kill, Olick & Oshinsky 
2 000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Suite 7500 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Re: C8X Asbestos Coverage Litigation 
Dear Sherry: 
Enclosed is the signed settlement letter recently 
forwarded to me from Southern American. 
With best regards, 
Sincerely, 
Robert fy. Heggestad 
REH/pdh 
Enclosure 
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PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL 
8ETTLEHENT COMMUNICATION 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
Casey, Scott, Canfield & Heggestad, P.C. 
The Southern Building 
805 15th Street, N.W. 
Suite 600 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Re: Southern American/CSXT Asbestos Coverage Settlement 
Dear Bob: 
*This will confirm the arrangements agreed to in connection 
with the asbestos-related settlement between Southern American 
Insurance Company ("Southern") and CSX Transportation, Inc. 
("CSXT")* The arrangements that have been agreed to are: 
Settlement Terms, Southern sold third-party liability 
insurance policies to one or more of CSXT's predecessor 
railroads. Subject to the modifications noted below, Southern 
agrees to join and participate in the Settlement Agreement 
executed by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and London 
Market Insurance Companies on September 16, 1988; by CSXT and its 
parent corporation CSX Corporation (collectively "CSX"), on 
September 19, 1988; and by Harbor Insurance Company on September 
20, 1988 (the "Settlement Agreement"), which is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
a. The DEFINITIONS Section of the Settlement 
Agreement is hereby amended to read as follows. 
"Coverage Suits" means the actions titled The 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, et al. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, and London Market 
Insurance Companies, et al. and Western Maryland 
Railway Company v. Harbor Insurance Company, et al,, 
Civil Action No. 85-3162 (D.D.C) and No. 85-3163 
(D.D.C.), filed in the United States District Court for 
the'District of Columbia on October^, 1985, and CSX 
RECEIVED OCT 2 8 raft 
0 0 0 2 o -' 
SHERRY WARD GILBERT 
DIRECT DIAL (202) 728 3104 
ANDERSON KILL OLICK & OSHINSKY 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
October 14, 1991 
Page 2 
Transportation, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co,, 
Civil Action No. 9G-00015-R, filed in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on 
January 11, 1990. 
b. Exhibit A to the Settlement Agreement has been modified 
and a copy is attached hereto. 
c. "Section I. PAYMENT PROVISIONS" is deleted in its 
entirety, and the following shall be substituted 
therefor: 
Section I. PAYMENT PROVISIONS 
In settlement of the Coverage Suits, the 
parties agree to the following payment 
provisions: 
1. Southern will pay CSX the sum of 
$308,000.00 as follows: 
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991 
$102,667.00 on November 30, 1991 
$102,666.00 on December 31, 1991 
This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any 
claim by CSX against the policies issued by 
Southern for any losses due to Asbestos-
Related Claims, past, present, or future, 
vhether or not asserted in the Coverage 
Suits. 
2. Southern shall not be liable to pay 
CSX for losses due to Asbestos-
Related Claims other than as set 
forth in this Agreement. 
d
* Effective Date. From and after the countersigning of 
this letter, the Settlement Agreement, as modified 
herein, shall be in full force and effect as between 
CSX and Southern and their respective obligations and 
undertakings shall be the same as if Southern had been 
an original settling "Insurer" as defined in the 
Settlement Agreement* 
0 0 0 2 6 5 
ANDERSON KILL OLICK & OSHINSKY 
Robert E. Heggestad, Esquire 
October 14, 1991 
Page 3 
e. Notice. Any notice or correspondence to Southern 
regarding the Settlement Agreement shall be in writing 
addressed to: 
Mr. Max Levine 
Vice President/Claims 
1450 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84 606 
Please have the enclosed copy of this letter executed on 
behalf of Southern and return it to me at your earliest 
convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
Sherry w. Gilbert 
ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADOPTED BY 
ACKNOWLEDGED AND ADOPTED BY SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. COMPANY 
By: n^U^U/ Bv: X^^p^Ss^, y 
I t s : V V Tjys, , / /^ S,C-r^JCrl.f:Vl m f A f J i t s : JK& ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
V 
Dated; /D~/7~^f Dated: /J~> J^T / 
0 0 0 2 6 6 
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L0S ANGELES, CALIF, ™,S UfTH OAVOF AUGUST, 1979 
PRODUCER'S COPY 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE o 
c 
HU *O0O- 7 (REV. 1-74) 0 0 0 3 3 1 
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
SECTION 1. DECLARATIONS 
1.1 NAMED INSURED AND ADDRESS: ( P E R ^ M E D ^ W E D ^ N D O R S E M E H T ) 
2 NORTH CHARLES STREET, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201 
1.2 POLICY PERIOD: FROM JULY 1*4, 1979 TO JULY \k9 1980 
(NOON fc*3C»5tX*XM- STANDARD TIME AT THE ABOVE ADURLSS 
OF THE NAMED INSURED) 
1.3 PREMIUM: 
RATE: $ . 5 5 5 2 2 PER $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 REVENUE 
DEPOSIT: $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 9 5 6 , 1 2 9 . 0 0 MINIMUM: 
1.4 RETAINED LIMIT - PERSONAL INJURY AND e r r cunnR^FMP^T M.i 1 
PROPERTY DAMAGE: 5 E E END0RSEMENT NO.2 
1. 5 OCCURRENCE LIMIT - PERSONAL INJURY AND *Q
 0 0 0 O 0 « o n 
PROPERTY DAMAGE: j u . u ^ . w w . u u 
1.6 AGGREGATE LIMIT - OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: $ $ 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1.7 THE INSURED REPRESENTS THAT IT HAS NOT PURCHASED OR HAD 
PURCHASED FOR ITS ACCOUNT INSURANCE AFFORDING P R O T E C -
TION AGAINST LIABILITY TO THE EXTENT OF "ULTIMATE NET LOSS" 
WITHIN THE RETAINED LIMIT AS EXPRESSED IN SECTION 1.4, EX-
C E P T FOR: . 
SEE ENDORSEMENT HO. 3 
AND COVERAGE OF RAILROAD PROTECTIVE, SPECIAL TOURS AND 
SIMILAR TYPES O F COVERAGE AS WELL AS OTHER SPECIFIC INSUR-
ANCES NOT INVOLVING DIRECT RAILROAD OPERATING EXPOSURES 
AND AGREES TO GIVE THE HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY 10 DAYS 
ADVANCE WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION TO PURCHASE OR TO 
HAVE PURCHASED FOR ITS ACCOUNT ANY OTHER SUCH INSURANCE. 
ATTACHED TO AND FORMING A PART OF POLICY NO. 137030 
ISSUED TO: CHESS IE SYSTEM, INC., ET AL 
DATED: AUGUST \k, 1979 
HARBOR INSURANCE COM PAN Y 
BY 
(AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE) 
(PROVISIONS ON PAGES 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 AND 10 ARE 
HEREBY REFERRED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF) 
HU 8179 (1 OF 10) (ED. 8/78) 6 0 0 3 3 2 
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EXCESS INDEMNITY RAILROAD OPERATIONS POLICY 
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
(A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY. HEREIN CALLED THE COMPANY) 
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM, IN RELIANCE 
UPON THE STATEMENTS IN SECTION 1. MADE A PART HEREOF AND SUB-
JECT TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY. AGREES WITH THE IN-
SURED NAMED IN SECTION 1.1 AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 2. INSURING AGREEMENTS 
2. 1 COVERAGE. THE COMPANY WILL INDEMNIFY THE INSURED FOR ALL 
SUMS WHICH THE INSURED SHALL BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO 
PAY AS DAMAGES (ALL AS HEREINAFTER DEFINED AS INCLUDED 
WITHIN THE TERM "ULTIMATE NET LOSS') BECAUSE OF PERSONAL 
INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE. CAUSED BY AN OCCURRENCE AND 
ARISING OUT OF OPERATIONS NECESSARY TO THE CONDUCT OF THE 
BUSINESS OF THE NAMED INSURED. 
2. 2 RETAINED LIMIT - OTHER INSURANCE. THE COMPANY SHALL BE LIA-
BLE ONLY FOR THAT AMOUNT OF ULTIMATE NET LOSS RESULTING 
FROM ANY ONE OCCURRENCE WHICH IS IN EXCESS OF: 
(A) THE AMOUNT STATED IN SECTION 1.4 AS "RETAINED LIMIT". OR 
(B) THE AMOUNT OF THE APPLICABLE LIMIT OR LIMITS OF LIABILI-
TY OF OTHER INSURANCE CARRIED BY THE INSURED OR ON ITS 
BEHALF, IF THE AMOUNT OF SUCH LIMIT OR LIMITS, OR THE 
AGGREGATE THEREOF, IS GREATER THAN THE AMOUNT STATED 
IN SECTION 1.4 AS THE "RETAINED LIMIT". 
2 . 3 LIMITS OF LIABILITY. REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS 
OR ORGANIZATIONS WHO MAY CLAIM INDEMNITY UNDER THIS POLICY 
AS INSUREDS, THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR ULTIMATE NET LOSS 
BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM ANY ONE OCCURRENCE SHALL THEN BE LIMITED TO THE 
AMOUNT STATED IN SECTION 1.5 AS "OCCURRENCE LIMIT- PERSONAL 
INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE"; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE 
COMPANY'S LIABILITY SHALL BE FURTHER LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT 
STATED IN SECTION 1. 6 WITH RESPECT TO ALL ULTIMATE NET LOSS 
BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY WHICH OCCURS DURING EACH AN-
NUAL PERIOD WHILE THIS POLICY IS IN FORCE COMMENCING FROM 
ITS EFFECTIVE DATE, AND WHICH ARISES OUT OF OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASES OF EMPLOYEES OF THE INSURED. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE LIMIT OF THE COMPANY'S 
LIABILITY, ALL PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING 
HU 8179 (2 OF 10) - 2 - 0 0 0 3 8 3 
OUT OF CONTINUOUS OR R E P E A T E D EXPOSURE TO SUBSTANTIALLY 
THE SAME GENERAL CONDITION EXISTING AT OR EMANATING FROM 
ONE LOCATION OR SOURCE SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS ARISING OUT 
OF ONE OCCURRENCE. 
2 .4 EXPENSES. THE COMPANY WILL INDEMNIFY THE INSURED FOR EXPEN-
SES PAID OR INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN CONNECTION WITH P E R -
SONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISING OUT OF AN OCCUR-
RENCE TO WHICH THIS POLICY A P P L I E S . SUCH EXPENSE IS PAYABLE 
IN ADDITION TO ANY LIMIT O F THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR ULTI-
MATE NET LOSS, BUT THE COMPANY SHALL NOT BE OBLIGATED TO 
PAY ANY GREATER PROPORTION OF SUCH EXPENSE THAN THE 
AMOUNT OF ULTIMATE NET LOSS PAYABLE UNDER THIS POLICY 
BEARS TO THE TOTAL OF A L L ULTIMATE NET LOSS RESULTING FROM 
SUCH OCCURRENCE. 
2. 5 POLICY PERIOD: TERRITORY. THIS POLICY APPLIES ONLY TO O C -
CURRENCES DURING THE POLICY PERIOD AS STATED IN SECTION 1. 2 
AND 
(1) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ITS TERRITORIES OR 
POSSESSIONS, OR CANADA, OR 
(2) ELSEWHERE THAN WITHIN THE TERRITORY DESCRIBED IN PARA-
GRAPH (1) ABOVE, PROVIDED THE ORIGINAL SUIT FOR DAMAGES 
AGAINST THE INSURED IS BROUGHT WITHIN SUCH TERRITORY. 
SECTION 3. SEVERABILITY O F INTERESTS: DEFINITION OF INSURED 
3 .1 THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY APPLIES SEPARATELY 
TO EACH INSURED AGAINST WHOM CLAIM IS MADE OR SUIT IS 
BROUGHT, E X C E P T WITH R E S P E C T TO THE LIMITS OF THE COMPA-
NY'S LIABILITY, AND THE INCLUSION HEREIN OF MORE THAN ONE IN-
SURED SHALL NOT OPERATE TO INCREASE THE LIMITS OF THE COM-
PANY'S LIABILITY. 
3 .2 "INSURED" MEANS THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN SEC-
TION 1.1 AND ANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DIRECTOR OR STOCKHOLD-
ER T H E R E O F WHILE ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS DUTIES AS 
SUCH. 
"INSURED" SHALL ALSO INCLUDE: 
(1) ANY SUBSIDIARY OF THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN 
SECTION 1.1 ACQUIRED SUBSEQUENT TO THE E F F E C T I V E DATE 
O F THIS POLICY AND COMING UNDER THE CONTROL AND A C -
TIVE MANAGEMENT OF T H E PERSON OR ORGANIZATION NAMED IN 
SECTION 1 . 1 , PROVIDED WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE ACQUISITION 
OF SUCH SUBSIDIARY IS GIVEN TO THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS 
T H E R E A F T E R , OR 
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(2) ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION COMING UNDER THE CONTROL AND 
ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION 
NAMED IN SECTION 1.1 SUBSEQUENT TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF THIS POLICY, PROVIDED WRITTEN NOTICE OF SUCH CON-
TROL AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SUCH ORGANIZATION IS GIV-
EN TO THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER. 
SUCH WRITTEN NOTICE SHALL ALSO STATE THE DATE ON WHICH THE 
INSURANCE FOR SUCH SUBSIDIARY OR OTHER ORGANIZATION IS TO 
COMMENCE WHICH DATE SHALL NOT BE PRIOR TO THE DATE SUCH 
SUBSIDIARY OR OTHER ORGANIZATION COMES UNDER THE CONTROL 
AND ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION 
NAMED IN SECTION 1 . 1 . 
SECTION 4. OTHER DEFINITIONS 
4. 1 "AIRCRAFT" MEANS ANY HEAVIER THAN AIR OR LIGHTER THAN AIR 
AIRCRAFT DESIGNED TO TRANSPORT PERSONS OR PROPERTY. 
4. 2 "AUTOMOBILE" MEANS A LAND MOTOR VEHICLE, TRAILER OR SEMI-
TRAILER, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY VEHICLES WHILE OPERATED 
ON RAILS. 
4 . 3 "OCCURRENCE" MEANS AN ACCIDENT, INCLUDING CONTINUOUS OR 
R E P E A T E D EXPOSURE TO CONDITIONS, WHICH RESULTS IN PERSONAL 
INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE NEITHER EXPECTED NOR INTENDED 
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE INSURED. 
4 . 4 "PERSONAL INJURY" MEANS BODILY INJURY, MENTAL ANGUISH, 
SHOCK. SICKNESS OR DISEASE. INCLUDING DEATH RESULTING T H E R E -
FROM; AND INJURY ARISING OUT OF FALSE ARREST, DETENTION OR 
IMPRISONMENT, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, WRONGFUL ENTRY OR 
EVICTION. RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (EXCEPT WHERE 
INSURANCE FOR SUCH OCCURRENCE IS PROHIBITED BY LAW OR REGU-
LATION), LIBEL. SLANDER, DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER OR INVA-
SION OF PRIVACY. 
4 . 5 " P R O P E R T Y DAMAGE" MEANS INJURY TO OR DESTRUCTION O F TAN-
GIBLE PROPERTY (OTHER THAN PROPERTY OWNED BY THE NAMED 
INSURED) AND ALL DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS RESULTING 
THEREFROM 
4. 6 "ULTIMATE NET LOSS" MEANS THE TOTAL OF A L L DAMAGES, AS DE-
FINED BELOW, WITH RESPECT TO EACH OCCURRENCE: 
'DAMAGES" MEANS A L L SUMS WHICH THE INSURED, OR ANY COM-
PANY AS ITS INSURER, OR BOTH, BECOME LEGALLY OBLIGATED 
TO PAY AS DAMAGES. WHETHER BY REASON OF ADJUDICATION OR 
HU 8179 (4 O F 10) - 4 -
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SETTLEMENT, BECAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY 
DAMAGE TO WHICH THIS POLICY APPLIES . IN DETERMINING THE 
RETAINED LIMIT IN SECTION 2. 2 FOREGOING, 'DAMAGES" SHALL 
BE AS DEFINED HEREIN, LESS AMOUNTS REALIZED FROM THIRD-
PARTY RECOVERIES AND THE NET VALUE OF SALVAGE; 
PROVIDED "ULTIMATE NET LOSS" SHALL NOT INCLUDE EXPENSES 
AND SHALL NOT INCLUDE ANY DAMAGES BECAUSE OF LIABILITY EX-
CLUDED BY THIS POLICY. 
4. 7 "EXPENSES" MEANS INTEREST ACCRUING AFTER ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
AND A L L REASONABLE EXPENSES (INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S F E E S AND 
COURT COSTS) INCURRED BY THE INSURED IN THE INVESTIGATION, 
S E T T L E M E N T AND DEFENSE OF ANY CLAIM OR SUIT SEEKING SUCH 
DAMAGES AS DEFINED UNDER 'ULTIMATE NET LOSS" AS A CONSE-
QUENCE OF ANY OCCURRENCE HEREUNDER (EXCLUDING, HOWEVER, 
A L L OFFICE EXPENSES OF THE INSURED, ALL SALARIES, WAGES AND 
EXPENSES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE INSURED AND GENERAL RETAIN-
E R F E E S FOR ATTORNEYS NORMALLY PAID BY THE INSURED). 
SECTION 5. EXCLUSIONS 
THIS POLICY DOES NOT A P P L Y : 
5.1 TO PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE FOR WHICH THE IN-
SURED HAS ASSUMED LIABILITY UNDER ANY CONTRACT OR AGREE-
MENT, I F SUCH PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE O C -
CURRED OR COMMENCED PRIOR TO THE TIME SUCH CONTRACT OR 
AGREEMENT BECAME EFFECTTVE; 
5. 2 TO ANY OBLIGATION FOR WHICH THE INSURED OR ANY CARRIER AS 
ITS INSURER MAY BE HELD LIABLE: 
(1) UNDER ANY WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, OR ANY SIMILAR 
LAW, I F AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE GIVING RISE TO SUCH 
OBLIGATION THE INSURED IS NOT A QUALIFIED SELF-INSURER 
WITH R E S P E C T TO SUCH OBLIGATION, OR 
(2) UNDER ANY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OR DISABILITY BEN-
EFITS LAW. OR ANY SIMILAR LAW; 
5 .3 E X C E P T WITH RESPECT TO PERSONAL INJURY TO EMPLOYEES OF 
T H E INSURED ARISING OUT O F OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
BY THE INSURED, TO LIABILITY ARISING OUT O F THE OWNERSHIP, 
MAINTENANCE, OPERATION, USE, LOADING OR UNLOADING OF: 
(1) ANY AUTOMOBILE OWNED OR OPERATED BY OR RENTED OR 
LOANED TO THE INSURED, OR ANY OTHER AUTOMOBILE O P E R -
ATED BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY 
THE INSURED; 
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(2) ANY AIRCRAFT OWNED OR OPERATED BY OR RENTED OR 
LOANED TO THE INSURED. OR ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT OPERATED 
BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE IN-
SURED; 
(3) ANY WATERCRAFT. BUT THIS EXCLUSION SHALL NOT APPLY IF 
THE PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE ARISES OUT OF 
THE LOADING OR UNLOADING OF ANY WATERCRAFT AT PREMISES 
OWNED BY, RENTED TO OR CONTROLLED BY THE INSURED PRO-
VIDED SUCH WATERCRAFT IS NOT OWNED OR OPERATED BY OR IS 
NOT RENTED OR LOANED TO THE INSURED, OR IS NOT OPERATED 
BY ANY PERSON IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY THE IN-
SURED. 
5 .4 TO PROPERTY DAMAGE TO PROPERTY IN THE CARE, CUSTODY OR 
CONTROL OF THE INSURED OR PROPERTY AS TO WHICH THE INSURED 
IS FOR ANY PURPOSE EXERCISING PHYSICAL CONTROL. 
SECTION 6. CONDITIONS 
6. 1 PREMIUM. THE DEPOSIT PREMIUM IN SECTION 1. 3 IS AN ADVANCE 
PREMIUM ONLY. EARNED PREMIUM SHALL BE COMPUTED AT THE 
END OF EACH ANNUAL PERIOD FOR WHICH THE POLICY IS IN FORCE 
AT THE RATES APPLICABLE THERETO, PROVIDED THAT SUCH 
EARNED PREMIUM SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN THE MINIMUM PREMI-
UM STATED IN SECTION 1 .3 . A P P R O P R I A T E ADDITIONAL PREMIUM 
SHALL BE PAYABLE WITH RESPECT TO ANY ADDITIONAL NAMED IN-
SURED AND ANY SUBSIDIARY OR OTHER ORGANIZATION WHO B E -
COMES AN INSURED UNDER THE PROVISIONS O F SECTION 3 . 2 . 
"REVENUE" AS USED IN SECTION 1.3 SHALL MEAN THE TOTAL OF 
A L L FIGURES REPORTED AS TOTAL RAILWAY OPERATING REVENUES 
TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION UNDER THE UNIFORM 
SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. 
6. 2 AUDIT. THE COMPANY SHALL BE PE RMIT T E D TO EXAMINE AND AU-
DIT THE INSURED'S BOOKS AND RECORDS AT ANY TIME WHILE THIS 
POLICY IS IN FORCE AND WITHIN THREE YEARS A F T E R THE FINAL 
TERMINATION OF THIS POLICY OR WITHIN ONE YEAR A F T E R FINAL 
SETTLEMENT OF A L L CLAIMS ARISING OUT O F ANY OCCURRENCE 
DURING THE POLICY TERM. 
6. 3 NOTICE OF OCCURRENCE. WHENEVER IT APPEARS THAT AN OCCUR-
RENCE MAY POSSIBLY INVOLVE CLAIMS IN THE AGGREGATE TOTAL-
ING MORE THAN 50% OF THE RETAINED LIMIT, WRITTEN NOTICE 
THEREOF SHALL BE GIVEN TO THE COMPANY OR ANY OF ITS AU-
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THORIZED AGENTS AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. SUCH NOTICE SHALL 
CONTAIN PARTICULARS SUFFICIENT TO IDENTIFY THE INSURED AND 
ALSO REASONABLY OBTAINABLE INFORMATION RESPECTING THE 
TIME, PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OCCURRENCE, THE 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE INJURED AND OF AVAILABLE 
WITNESSES. 
6.4 ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF THE INSURED. THE INSURED 
SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OR DEFENSE OF ANY 
CLAIM MADE OR SUIT BROUGHT OR PROCEEDING INSTITUTED 
AGAINST THE INSURED WHICH NO OTHER INSURER IS OBLIGATED TO 
DEFEND THE INSURED SHALL USE DUE DILIGENCE AND PRUDENCE 
TO SETTLE ALL SUCH CLAIMS AND SUITS WHICH IN THE EXERCISE OF 
SOUND JUDGMENT SHOULD B E SETTLED, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT 
THE INSURED SHALL MAKE NO SETTLEMENT FOR ANY SUM IN EXCESS 
O F THE RETAINED LIMIT WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE COMPANY. 
WHEN IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COMPANY AN OCCURRENCE MAY IN-
VOLVE DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF THE RETAINED LIMIT OR THE LIMIT 
O F OTHER INSURANCE, THE COMPANY MAY ELECT AT ANY TIME TO 
PARTICIPATE WITH THE INSURED AND ANY OTHER INSURER IN THE IN-
VESTIGATION, SETTLEMENT, AND DEFENSE OF ALL CLAIMS AND 
SUITS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. THE INSURED WILL, AT THE RE-
QUEST OF THE COMPANY, SUPPLY COPIES OF ANY INVESTIGATIVE RE-
PORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, OPINIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DE-
FENSE COUNSEL AND ANY OTHER MATERIAL ACCUMULATED IN P R E P -
ARATION OF THE DEFENSE OF THE CLAIM OR SUIT 
THE INSURED SHALL COOPERATE WITH THE OTHER INSURERS AS R E -
QUIRED BY THE TERMS OF THE OTHER INSURANCE POLICIES AND COM-
PLY WITH ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS THEREOF, AND SHALL 
ENFORCE ANY RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY AGAINST ANY 
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WHO MAY BE LIABLE TO THE INSURED B E -
CAUSE OF PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WITH RESPECT 
TO WHICH INSURANCE IS AFFORDED UNDER THIS POLICY OR ANY OTH-
ER POLICY. 
6. 5 A P P E A L S IN THE EVENT THE INSURED OR ANY OTHER INSURER 
E L E C T S NOT TO A P P E A L A JUDGMENT WHICH EXCEEDS THE R E -
TAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMITS, THE COMPANY MAY E L E C T TO 
MAKE SUCH A P P E A L . THE COMPANY SHALL BE LIABLE IN ADDITION 
T O THE APPLICABLE LTMIT OF LIABILITY, FOR ALL COSTS, TAXES, 
EXPENSES INCURRED AND INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO SUCH AN A P P E A L . 
6. 6 LOSS PAYABLE. THE COMPANY'S LIABIUTY UNDER THIS P O U C Y WITH 
R E S P E C T TO ANY OCCURRENCE SHALL NOT ATTACH UNTIL THE 
AMOUNT O F THE APPLICABLE RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMIT 
HAS BEEN PAID BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE INSURED ON ACCOUNT OF 
SUCH OCCURRENCE. THE INSURED SHALL MAKE CLAIM FOR ANY LOSS 
UNDER THIS POLICY AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE A FT E R: 
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(A) THE INSURED SHALL HAVE PAID ULTIMATE NET LOSS IN EXCESS 
OF THE RETAINED OR OTHER INSURANCE LIMIT WITH RESPECT 
TO ANY OCCURRENCE, OR 
(B) THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO PAY SUCH AMOUNTS SHALL HAVE 
BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
INSURED AFTER ACTUAL TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF 
THE INSURED, THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY. 
CLAIM FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE INSURED ON 
ACCOUNT OF THE SAME OCCURRENCE SHALL BE SIMILARLY MADE. 
ALL LOSSES COVERED BY THIS POLICY SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE 
BY THE COMPANY WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THEY ARE RESPECTIVELY 
CLAIMED AND PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS 
POLICY. 
6. 7 ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY. NO ACTION SHALL LIE AGAINST THE 
COMPANY UNLESS, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT THERETO, THE IN-
SURED SHALL HAVE FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL THE TERMS OF THIS 
POLICY, NOR UNTIL THE AMOUNT OF THE INSURED'S OBLIGATION TO 
PAY SHALL HAVE BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED EITHER BY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE INSURED AFTER ACTUAL TRIAL OR BY WRITTEN AGREE-
MENT OF THE INSURED, THE CLAIMANT AND THE COMPANY. 
ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION OR THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
THEREOF WHO HAS SECURED SUCH JUDGMENT OR WRITTEN AGREE-
MENT SHALL THEREAFTER BE ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THIS 
POLICY TO THE EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE AFFORDED BY THIS POL-
ICY. NO PERSON OR ORGANIZATION SHALL HAVE ANY RIGHT UNDER 
THIS POLICY TO JOIN THE COMPANY AS A PARTY TO ANY ACTION 
AGAINST THE INSURED TO DETERMINE THE INSURED'S LIABILITY. 
NOR SHALL THE COMPANY BE IMPLEADED BY THE INSURED OR HIS 
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE. BANKRUPTCY OR INSOLVENCY OF THE IN-
SURED OR OF THE INSURED'S ESTATE SHALL NOT RELIEVE THE COM-
PANY OF ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS HEREUNDER. 
6. 8 SUBROGATION. IN THE EVENT OF ANY PAYMENT UNDER THIS POLICY, 
THE COMPANY SHALL PARTICIPATE WITH THE INSURED AND ANY OTH-
ER INSURER IN THE EXERCISE OF THE INSURED'S RIGHTS OF RECOV-
ERY AGAINST ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION LIABLE THEREFOR, EX-
CEPT AN INSURED HEREIN. RECOVERIES SHALL BE APPLIED FIRST 
TO REIMBURSE ANY INTEREST (INCLUDING THE INSURED) THAT MAY 
HAVE PAID ANY AMOUNT WITH RESPECT TO LIABILITY IN EXCESS OF 
THE LIMIT OF THE COMPANY'S LIABILITY HEREUNDER; THEN TO RE-
IMBURSE THE COMPANY UP TO THE AMOUNT PAID HEREUNDER; AND 
LASTLY TO REIMBURSE SUCH INTERESTS (INCLUDING THE INSURED), 
OF WHOM THIS INSURANCE IS EXCESS, AS ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM 
THE RESIDUE, IF ANY; BUT A DIFFERENT APPORTIONMENT MAY BE 
MADE TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT OF A CLAIM BY AGREEMENT SIGNED 
BY ALL INTERESTS. REASONABLE EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE EXER-
HU 8179 (8 OF 10) - 8 - 0 0 0 3 3 9 
CISE OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY SHALL BE APPORTIONED AMONG ALL 
INTERESTS IN THE RATIO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOSSES FOR WHICH 
RECOVERY IS SOUGHT. 
6. 9 CHANGES. NOTICE TO ANY AGENT OR KNOWLEDGE POSSESSED BY ANY 
AGENT OR BY ANY OTHER PERSON SHALL NOT EFFECT A WAIVER OR 
A CHANGE IN ANY PART OF THIS POLICY OR ESTOP THE COMPANY 
FROM ASSERTING ANY RIGHTS UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY; 
NOR SHALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY BE WAIVED OR CHANGED, EX-
CEPT BY ENDORSEMENT ISSUED TO FORM A PART OF THIS POLICY, 
SIGNED BY AN AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMPANY. 
6. 10 ASSIGNMENT. ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST UNDER THIS POLICY SHALL 
NOT BIND THE COMPANY UNTIL ITS CONSENT IS ENDORSED HEREON. 
6.11 CANCELLATION. THIS POLICY MAY BE CANCELLED BY THE NAMED 
INSURED FIRST NAMED IN SECTION 1. 1 OR BY THE COMPANY BY MAIL-
ING TO THE OTHER PARTY WRITTEN NOTICE STATING WHEN, NOT 
LESS THAN 30 DAYS THEREAFTER, CANCELLATION SHALL BE EFFEC-
TIVE. THE MAILING OF NOTICE AS AFORESAID SHALL BE SUFFICIENT 
PROOF OF NOTICE AND THE EFFECTIVE DATE AND HOUR OF CANCEL-
LATION STATED EST THE NOTICE SHALL BECOME THE END OF THE 
POLICY PERIOD. DELIVERY OF SUCH WRITTEN NOTICE EITHER BY THE 
NAMED INSURED OR BY THE COMPANY SHALL BE EQUIVALENT TO 
MAILING. 
IF THE NAMED INSURED CANCELS, EARNED PREMIUM SHALL BE COM-
PUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CUSTOMARY SHORT RATE TABLE 
AND PROCEDURE. IF THE COMPANY CANCELS, EARNED PREMIUM 
SHALL BE COMPUTED PRO RATA. PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT MAY BE 
MADE EITHER AT THE TIME CANCELLATION IS EFFECTED OR AS SOON 
AS PRACTICABLE AFTER CANCELLATION BECOMES EFFECTIVE, BUT 
PAYMENT OR TENDER OF UNEARNED PREMIUM IS NOT A CONDITION 
OF CANCELLATION. 
IN THE EVENT THAT THE COMPANY OR ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENT-
ATIVE HAS ISSUED OR MAY ISSUE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE INSURED. 
CERTIFICATES OF INSURANCE AND/OR STATUTORY FILINGS AND/OR 
OTHER EVIDENCES OF INSURANCE (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS 
CERTIFICATES) UNDER THIS POLICY WHICH CERTIFICATES REQUIRE 
THE COMPANY TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO THE 
RECIPIENTS OF SUCH CERTIFICATES OR OTHERS, THEN THE INSURED. 
IF IT SHOULD ELECT TO CANCEL THIS POLICY, SHALL GIVE THE COM-
PANY NOT LESS THAN THE SAME ADVANCE NOTICE OF CANCELLA-
TION AS IS REQUIRED TO BE GIVEN BY THE COMPANY UNDER SUCH 
CERTIFICATES AND IN DOING SO SHALL ALLOW THE COMPANY NOT 
LESS THAN THREE BUSINESS DAYS FOR THE PREPARATION AND MAIL-
ING OF SUCH NOTICES OF CANCELLATION TO THE RECIPIENTS OF 
SUCH CERTIFICATES. 
6. 12 DECLARATIONS. BY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS POLICY THE NAMED IN-
SURED AGREES THAT THE STATEMENTS IN THE APPLICATION AND IN 
SECTION 1. AND IN ANY SUBSEQUENT NOTICE RELATING TO UNDER-
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LYING INSURANCE. WHICH ARE OFFERED AS AN INDUCEMENT TO THE 
COMPANY TO ISSUE AND CONTINUE THIS POLICY. ARE ITS AGREE-
MENTS AND REPRESENTATIONS. THAT THIS POLICY IS ISSUED AND 
CONTINUED IN RELIANCE UPON THE TRUTH OF SUCH REPRESENTA-
TIONS AND THAT THIS POLICY EMBODIES ALL AGREEMENTS EXIST-
ING BETWEEN THE NAMED INSURED AND THE COMPANY OR ANY OF 
ITS AGENTS RELATING TO THIS INSURANCE 
ATTACHED TO AND FORMING A PART OF POLICY NO. . , , - „ . , 
ISSUED TO: CHESS IE SYSTEM, INC. , ET AL 
DATED: AUGUST \k, \>JJ 
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY 
BY 
(AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE) 
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